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Boatman: A Continuing Conundrum: Applying Consistent Gender-Neutral Crite

Notes
A CONTINUING CONUNDRUM: APPLYING
CONSISTENT GENDER-NEUTRAL CRITERIA
TO FEDERAL SENTENCING DEPARTURES
BASED ON FAMILY TIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the federal sentencing regime, district court judges must first
consult the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) in order
to determine a defendant’s sentence.1 However, a defendant may move
for a downward departure from that sentencing range based on family
ties and responsibilities.2 In doing so, the defendant asks the judge to
decrease his or her sentence in light of the important role that the
defendant plays in the family unit.3
Take for example three defendants who reside in different
jurisdictions and received convictions for the same offense, conspiracy to
distribute marijuana.4 All three defendants are prosecuted under federal
law, all are first time offenders with no other criminal history, and all
move for downward departures based on their family ties and
responsibilities.5 The first defendant, Linda Smith, resides in New
Mexico and is the sole financial provider for her unemployed husband
and three children under the age of eight, one of whom suffers from a

See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of how district courts utilize the Guidelines
for sentencing determinations).
2
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012) (providing
that family ties and responsibilities is not an “ordinarily relevant” basis for departure); see
also infra Part II.C (discussing downward departures based on family ties and
responsibilities in federal sentencing).
3
See infra Part II.C (providing relevant history regarding downward departures based
on family ties and responsibilities under the Guidelines).
4
The following example is fictional and does not refer to actual convictions.
5
Although courts consider many different factors in assessing sentencing
determinations, the following example simplifies the sentencing process in order to
highlight the issues related to sentencing departures based on family ties and
responsibilities. For this example, assume that each defendant would face the same
potential term of imprisonment according to a proper calculation of the sentence under the
Guidelines. See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of the way in which district courts
apply the Guidelines).
1
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heart defect that requires attentive care.6 Linda works long hours to
ensure that she can provide for her family, including the cost of medical
bills, but also works hard to ensure that she plays an active role in her
children’s lives. The second defendant, John Doe, resides in New York
and works two jobs to provide for his wife and two children.7 John’s
oldest son, age five, has special needs, and John plays an active role in
his son’s therapy and counseling. The third defendant, Michelle
Johnson, resides in Virginia and is a single mother of two children.8
Michelle’s children, ages ten and thirteen, spend most of their time with
their grandparents who reside in the same town.
At sentencing, both Michelle and Linda successfully obtained family
ties departures from the applicable guidelines sentence. Although the
courts in both John’s and Michelle’s hearings applied the same standard,
the outcome was different. At John’s hearing the judge determined that
providing primary financial support was not enough to justify a family
ties departure. At Michelle’s hearing, on the other hand, the judge
determined that Michelle’s status as the sole caretaker for two children
warranted departure.9 Conversely, at Linda’s hearing, the judge
determined departure was proper because the loss of Linda’s significant

Linda Smith’s residence in New Mexico places her within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Mexico. In this jurisdiction, the court determines
family ties and responsibilities departures based on whether the facts in a given case take
the defendant’s situation out of the “ordinary.” United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR
07-1602 JB, 2008 WL 2371564, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008), aff’d, 304 Fed.App’x 694 (10th Cir.
2008).
7
John Doe’s residence in New York places him within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York. In this jurisdiction, the court
determines family ties departures based on whether the facts of a given case will result in
“exceptional hardship” to the defendant’s family upon incarceration. United States v.
White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
8
Michelle Johnson’s residence in Virginia places her within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Here, the court applies an “exceptional
hardship” standard similar to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
See United States v. Velez, 249 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 (E.D. Va. 2002) (recognizing that the
Fourth Circuit utilizes the “exceptional hardship” standard when considering family ties
departures (citing United States v. Bell, 974 F.2d 537, 539 (4th Cir. 1992)).
9
The juxtaposition of John’s and Michelle’s cases highlight the issue of gender
stereotyping undertones inherent in a judge’s exercise of discretion in departing based on
family ties. See supra Parts III.B.1–2 (analyzing judicial reliance on gender stereotypes in
family ties departures). Because the current family ties departure standard is largely
subjective, judges are free to base their determinations on assumptions of male and female
roles within the family unit rather than the actual roles played by individual defendants in
their own respective families. See Patricia M. Wald, “What About the Kids?”: Parenting
Issues in Sentencing, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 138 (1995) (recognizing the risk that sentencing
judges may rely on gender stereotypes and view women as family caretakers over men
when making sentencing determinations).
6
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financial contributions rendered her family circumstances “out of the
ordinary.”10
Downward departures based on a defendant’s family ties have long
been a controversial and murky area in federal sentencing.11 As
evidenced in the above example, district courts lack a controlling
Despite
standard by which to analyze family ties departures.12
amendments to the Guidelines that might aid courts in applying
consistent and meaningful family ties departures, courts often apply
departure standards that fail to consider the devastating impact of a
defendant’s incarceration on innocent family members.13 However, even
district courts that successfully focus on this impact often fail to apply
the departure standard in a meaningful and objective way.14 The current
10
This determination reflects the disparities that exist between similarly situated
defendants attempting to move for downward departures based on family ties. Although
Linda and John share similar family circumstances, the courts in their jurisdictions apply
dissimilar departure standards. Thus, Linda is successful under her jurisdiction’s
departure standard while John is not. See infra Part III.A (analyzing unwarranted
disparities resulting from the application of differing departure standards).
11
See, e.g., Amy Farrell, Distinguishing Among the “Unhappys”: The Influence of Cultural
Gender Norms on Judicial Decisions to Grant Family Ties Departures, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 268,
268–73 (2001) (analyzing family ties departures across three different legal standards);
Placido G. Gomez, The Struggle Against Unwarranted Uniformity: The Evolution of Federal
Sentencing Departures Based on Extraordinary Family Circumstances the Case of Low-Level Drug
Offenders, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 77, 77–93 (1995) (arguing against unwarranted uniformity
in family ties departure determinations); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues In a PostBooker Federal Guidelines World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 716–26 (2006) (arguing that
family ties departures should focus on non-intuitive gender-related issues that would favor
maintenance of the family); Dana L. Shoenberg, Departures for Family Ties and Responsibilities
After Koon, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 292, 292–95 (1997) (examining the effects of Koon v. United
States on family ties departures); Tracy Tyson, Downward Departures Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines: Are Parenthood and Pregnancy Appropriate Sentencing Considerations?, 2
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 577, 599–606 (1993) (arguing that sentencing judges
should consider parental responsibilities and pregnancy in determining family ties
departures); Jody L. King, Note, Avoiding Gender Bias in Downward Departures for Family
Responsibilities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273, 273–312
(arguing that the exercise of wide discretion to depart based on family ties under the
standard in Koon v. United States runs the risk of gender bias entering into federal
sentencing).
12
See infra Part II.C (providing the differing family ties departure standards in and
among federal circuit courts following Koon v. United States and various amendments to the
Guidelines section regarding family ties).
13
See infra Part II.B (discussing the negative effects of incarceration on a defendant’s
family as well as society).
14
See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone: Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal
Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591, 594 (2009) (“If judicial discretion is to be consistent with
serving justice in the criminal justice system, a judge must exercise discretion free from
bias.”). Ramirez notes that because federal judges bring a variety of personal and legal
experiences to the bench, it is imperative that the judiciary recognize that judges’
unconscious or subconscious associations may influence decision making. Id. at 594–95.
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discretionary departure system results in unwarranted disparities
between similarly situated defendants and judicial reliance on gender
stereotypes, contrary to the goals of uniformity and justice in the exercise
of such discretion.15
This Note begins by providing a brief history and overview of the
Guidelines.16 Part II further looks to the harmful consequences faced by
family members upon a defendant’s incarceration and explores the
development of family ties departures under the Guidelines.17 Part III of
this Note analyzes the flaws and disparities that have resulted from the
lack of a uniform and objective family ties departure standard.18 Finally,
Part IV recommends amending the Guidelines to reflect a uniform and
objective family ties departure standard that would guide district courts
in applying an objective departure analysis.19
II. BACKGROUND
Judicial discretion, which is fundamentally inherent in the U.S.
criminal justice system, is of utmost importance when federal district

Another critic specifically recognizes that the exercise of judicial discretion to depart from
the Guidelines could entail judicial application of gender bias. King, supra note 11, at 274.
King further asserts that application of gender bias in family ties departures would result
in disparities between male and female offenders as women take on more family
responsibilities compared to men. Id. at 290–94. Thus, King argues that courts should
apply objective factors in assessing an offender’s family ties. Id. at 300–02; see infra Parts
III.B (analyzing the courts’ failure to objectively inquire into the effect of a defendant’s
incarceration on his or her innocent family members).
15
See infra Parts III.A–B (analyzing disparities in family ties departures between
similarly situated defendants due to a lack of uniform departure standards and the
presence of gender stereotyping in family ties departure decisions); infra note 33
(discussing the Guidelines’ role in effectuating the goal of uniformity in sentencing); see also
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (discussing the continuing importance of
sentencing uniformity in judicial discretion exercised under the Guidelines). One critic
argues that eliminating bias from the exercise of judicial discretion is fundamentally
important to achieving “any notion of justice.” Ramirez, supra note 14, at 595. The Model
Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”) further exemplifies this idea under canon 2,
which requires that “[a] judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially,
competently, and diligently.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2010). The
Model Code also requires judges to “perform all duties of judicial office fairly and
impartially” and “without bias or prejudice.” Id. at R. 2.2, 2.3. In doing so, the Model Code
explains that “[a] judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the
fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.” Id. at R. 2.3 cmt.
16
See infra Part II.A (explaining the history and operation of the Guidelines).
17
See infra Parts II.B–C (discussing the harmful effects of incarceration on the family as
well as the history of family ties departures).
18
See infra Part III (analyzing the continuing flaws in the courts’ application of family
ties departures).
19
See infra Part IV (providing proposed amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6).
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court judges maintain control over a defendant’s liberty through the
sentencing process.20 The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v.
Booker brought the issue of judicial discretion to the forefront of the
criminal justice system by restoring discretion in federal sentencing
under the Guidelines.21 While federal judges maintain discretion over
sentencing under the Guidelines, uniformity in sentencing remains a key
component in federal criminal jurisprudence.22 This Note focuses on the
exercise of judicial discretion to depart downward from the Guidelines
based on a defendant’s family ties and concludes that courts have failed
to apply a uniform and objective departure standard.23

Ramirez, supra note 14, at 594–95. Discretion is a crucial component of the justice
system because the legislature typically drafts laws sufficiently general enough to
encompass a wide variety of unlawful acts. Id. at 594. Further, the executive exercises
great discretion in prosecuting individuals. Id. Thus, the judiciary must maintain
discretion in order to restrain the power of the legislative and executive branches from
becoming abusive. Id. In a sentencing context, one critic notes that “[t]he nature and
degree of discretion accorded to a judge in determining the sentence of a convicted
criminal offender bears directly on the coherence and the legitimacy of any criminal justice
system.” William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to
§ 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 633 (2008). Berry contends that
unlimited judicial sentencing discretion yields unsatisfactory consequences because it
results in disparities between offenders with similar culpability. Id. However, completely
eliminating this discretion would also yield unsatisfactory results because the role of the
judge would be usurped, thus leading to unjust outcomes. Id.
21
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). The Court held that the once
mandatory Guidelines are now advisory in nature and that federal sentencing judges
should consider the Guidelines while “tailor[ing] the sentence in light of other statutory
concerns.” Id.; see Berry, supra note 20, at 650–61 (discussing the impact of Booker and its
progeny on the Guidelines); see also infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Booker’s impact regarding
family ties departures under the Guidelines). Berry recognizes two major theories
regarding the role the Guidelines played in sentencing after the Booker decision. Berry,
supra note 20, at 651–53. Under the first approach, the Guidelines were considered
mandatory for all intents and purposes despite the Court’s holding in Booker. Id. at 651–52.
On the other end of the spectrum, the second approach treated Booker as reviving the
indeterminate sentencing regime that existed prior to the Guidelines. Id. at 652–53.
22
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (“The . . . approach, which we now adopt, would (through
severance and excision of two provisions) make the Guidelines system advisory while
maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real
conduct—a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress
intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”); see also Michael Goldsmith & Marcus Porter,
Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: The Problem of Disparate Departures, 69 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 57, 57–58 (2000) (discussing the importance of uniformity in federal
sentencing). The Guidelines were originally promulgated in response to what Congress
viewed as widespread and unwarranted sentencing disparity. Id. at 57–58. The statutory
scheme under which the Guidelines were promulgated was designed to promote
uniformity in federal sentencing. Id. at 58.
23
For a discussion of the issues in courts’ application of family ties departures under the
Guidelines, see infra Part III.
20
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First, Part II.A provides the history and basic functioning of the
Guidelines.24 Next, Part II.B looks to the detrimental effects of a
defendant’s sentence on the defendant’s dependents and family
members.25 Then, Part II.C explains federal sentencing jurisprudence
concerning downward departures from the Guidelines based on a
defendant’s family ties.26 Part II.C.1 discusses the way district courts
have applied the Supreme Court’s departure standard in Koon v. United
States to family ties departures.27 Part II.C.2 then describes how
amendments to the Guidelines pursuant to the Prosecutorial Remedies
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003
(“PROTECT Act”) and the Court’s decision in Booker have affected
courts’ approaches to family ties departures in federal sentencing.28
A. The United States Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), federal judges
practiced indeterminate criminal sentencing.29 Under this method,
sentencing judges maintained broad discretion limited only by statutory
minimum and maximum sentencing ranges established by Congress.30
24
See infra Part II.A (providing the history and function of the Guidelines). This Note
concentrates on the evolution of family ties departures over time; thus, this Note will refer
to multiple sets of the Guidelines.
25
See infra Part II.B (discussing the family harms associated with incarceration).
26
See infra Part II.C (discussing family ties departures under the Guidelines).
27
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the impact of the Koon decision on family ties
departures).
28
See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing amendments to the Guidelines pursuant to the
PROTECT Act and Booker and their impact on family ties departures).
29
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment,
“Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1502
(2006); see Berry, supra note 20, at 636–37 (discussing the four main objectives of sentencing
during the era of indeterminate sentencing). The indeterminate sentencing system arose
out of policy favoring rehabilitative opportunities for inmates. Bissonnette, supra, at 1502;
see Berry, supra note 20, at 636–37 (listing the four objectives of indeterminate sentencing as
retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence). Rehabilitation ideals reflected
the belief that inmates should be given the opportunity to better themselves and become
productive members of society. Bissonnette, supra, at 1502. In light of this goal, sentencing
judges were free to determine “the goals of sentencing, the factors to be considered, and
how much weight to accord [certain] factors, as well as the ultimate punishment” on a caseby-case basis. Id. Thus, under this regime, Congress allowed the judiciary to consider
virtually unlimited information in determining an offender’s sentence. Berry, supra note
20, at 635.
30
Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1502. As long as the sentence fell within the range set by
Congress, the sentence was afforded “virtually unconditional deference on appeal.” Id.; see
also Koon v. United States., 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (explaining how federal judges wielded
wide discretion when deciding a criminal defendant’s sentence prior to the SRA).
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However, because such discretion often resulted in unwarranted
sentencing disparity, Congress enacted the SRA in an effort to increase
uniformity in federal criminal sentencing.31 Through the SRA, Congress
created the United States Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”)
and charged it with creating a comprehensive set of sentencing
guidelines aimed at decreasing disparity by providing suggested
The
sentencing ranges for each class of persons convicted.32
Commission, in turn, promulgated the Guidelines with the goal of
uniformity in sentencing.33
See Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1502–03 (discussing criticisms of the indeterminate
sentencing regime); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A,
introductory cmt. 3 (2012) (providing Congress’ three primary objectives in enacting the
SRA). The introduction to the Guidelines provides that the SRA’s ultimate objective is to
create an “effective, fair sentencing system” through uniformity, honesty, and
proportionality in sentencing. Id; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (providing that federal judges’
once wide discretion in criminal sentencing led to the perception that similarly situated
offenders received “unjustifiably” differing sentences); Sentencing Guidelines, 37 GEO. L.J.
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 667, 667 n.2033 (2008) (explaining that the federal sentencing
system in place prior to the SRA received criticism, in part, for resulting in widely different
punishments for similarly situated offenders). Critics of indeterminate sentencing argued
that it created an arbitrary system based on the whims of sentencing judges rather than the
law. Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1502; Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 57–58
(arguing that the SRA is “designed to promote uniformity by curtailing judicial
discretion”). For example, Berry notes that indeterminate sentencing led to disparities and
inconsistencies in sentencing due to unlimited judicial discretion combined with broad
statutory sentencing ranges. Berry, supra note 20, at 638. One federal judge described
judicial discretion under this regime as “almost wholly unchecked and
sweeping . . . [which is] terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to
the rule of law.” Id. (quoting Judge Marvin Frankel) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32
Koon, 518 U.S. at 92. Congress specifically charged the Commission with the task of
“rationaliz[ing] the sentencing rules, to bring to bear the latest scientific studies in
effectuating all of the purposes of punishment, and to do the kind of legwork in
determining the appropriate sentencing practices that Congress had been unable or
unwilling to do.” Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1504–05. Each class of “convicted persons”
is determined by comparing offense behavior with offender characteristics. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 2 (2012).
33
See Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (discussing the history behind the Guidelines). The SRA
sought to remedy the “’unjustifi[ed]’ and ‘shameful’ consequences” of the indeterminate
sentencing system, namely “the great variation among sentences imposed by different
judges upon similarly situated offenders.” Misretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366
(1988) (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 38, 65 (1983)). The Commission introduced the first set
of Guidelines three years after President Ronald Reagan signed the SRA into law in 1984.
Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1505. The SRA mandates that “[t]he Commission periodically
shall review and revise . . . the guidelines” as part of its duties. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006).
The Guidelines also provide that “[b]y monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines
and . . . analyzing their stated reasons for doing so . . . the Commission, over time, will be
able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should
not be permitted.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
4(b) (2012); see also Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 62–66 (providing a brief historical
31
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The Guidelines set forth forty-three base offense levels as well as six
criminal history categories.34 These offense levels and criminal history
categories, when collectively considered, culminate in a sentencing table
The SRA originally
containing designated sentencing ranges.35
mandated that district courts adhere to the Guidelines when determining
an offender’s sentence.36 Under that application, the judge must first
determine which base offense level correlates to the defendant’s
statutory conviction.37 Once the judge accounts for adjustments, the
judge must next determine the offender’s designated criminal history
category.38 Finally, the judge must consult the sentencing table to
background regarding the purpose, creation, and implementation of the Guidelines in
federal sentencing).
34
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2012) (setting forth the
sentencing table). To determine a defendant’s base offense level, the sentencing judge must
look to the Guidelines provision that correlates to the defendant’s conviction. Id.
§ 1B1.1(a)(1). The sentencing judge then determines the defendant’s criminal history
category by calculating criminal history points based on factors such as prior sentences, the
defendant’s age at the time of a prior offense, and whether the defendant commits an
offense while currently serving a sentence. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 685–88.
35
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 668. To offer a simple example, suppose John
Doe is convicted of voluntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a). According to
Guidelines section 2A1.3, a voluntary manslaughter conviction carries with it a base offense
level of twenty-nine. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.3(a) (2012). If this
constitutes Doe’s first criminal offense, he would have zero criminal history points and fall
within the first criminal history category. See id. § 4A1.1 (providing the framework for
calculating criminal history points); cf. id. ch. 5, pt. A (providing the sentencing table). The
offense level analyzed with the criminal history category in the sentencing table identifies
that the applicable sentencing range is 87 to 108 months imprisonment. Id.
36
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000). Under the SRA:
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range,
referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different
from that described.
Id. The mandatory nature of this provision was held unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in United States v. Booker. 543 U.S. 220, 259–65 (2005); see also infra Part II.C.2
(discussing the Court’s ruling in Booker and its impact on the Guidelines).
37
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1) (2012); Sentencing Guidelines, supra
note 31, at 668. A judge may also adjust the defendant’s base offense level according to
“the defendant’s role in the offense,” “the defendant’s role in any obstructive conduct,”
“the relationship between the counts of which the defendant was convicted,” “the
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the offense,” and “the level of victim harm.”
Id. at 668.
38
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(6), 4A1.1 (2012); Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 685. Each criminal history category in the sentencing table
covers two to three criminal history points. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5,
pt. A (2012). A defendant may receive an increase in his or her criminal history category if
he or she has been previously convicted or if he or she “commits another offense while
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determine the defendant’s applicable sentencing range.39 Because the
Commission intended for each guideline range to carve out a
“heartland” of typical cases correlating to the offense and the offender,
district courts are only to consider whether a departure from the range is
warranted in cases involving unusual or atypical circumstances.40
The Commission also offers guidance as to what factual
circumstances may warrant a departure from the Guidelines by
categorizing potential factors as prohibited, encouraged, and
discouraged for sentencing determination.41 A court may never consider
serving any criminal justice sentence.” Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 685–88.
Assignment of criminal history points is based on a defendant’s actual judgment rather
than time served. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2 (2012).
39
Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 668; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,
ch. 5, pt. A (2012) (providing the Guidelines sentencing table).
40
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (2012)
(discussing departures from the Guidelines). The Guidelines section that deals with
departures states:
(1) IN GENERAL.—The sentencing court may depart from the
applicable guideline range if—
(A) in the case of offenses other than child crimes and sexual
offenses, the court finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance;
or
(B) in the case of child crimes and sexual offenses, the court
finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(i), that there
exists an aggravating circumstance,
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that, in
order to advance the objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2),
should result in a sentence different from that described.
Id. § 5K2.0 policy statement. The Commission allowed for judicial discretion in departures
even under the mandatory Guidelines because of the difficulty it faced in creating a set of
guidelines that encompassed all conduct relevant to sentencing determinations. Id. at ch. 1,
pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b). Further, the Commission does not believe that courts will
depart from the Guidelines very often in light of the “heartland” concept. Id.; see Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 93–94 (1996) (finding that the Commission did not adequately
take unusual cases into consideration when promulgating sentencing guidelines so that
atypical factors may provide a basis for departure). Sentencing judges have discretion to
depart upwards or downwards under certain circumstances but are required to explain
their reasons for exercising such discretion in accordance with the Guidelines. Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 695–96.
41
Koon, 518 U.S. at 93–95. The Commission precludes district courts from departing
downward from the Guidelines based on prohibited factors. Sentencing Guidelines, supra
note 31, at 697; see infra note 42 (listing factors prohibited by the Commission for sentencing
consideration). Further, the Guidelines discourage downward departures based on the
defendant’s personal attributes unless the case at hand is “exceptional.” Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 697; see infra note 44 (listing factors that are discouraged in
sentencing consideration). Finally, the Guidelines encourage downward departures based
on mitigating factors. Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 697; see infra note 43 (listing
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certain factors, such as race or national origin, as a basis for departure.42
However, a departure may be warranted when an encouraged factor is
present to a significantly higher degree than already accounted for in the
applicable guideline.43 Discouraged factors, on the other hand, are not
typically relevant in considering whether a departure is warranted, and
thus the Commission directs district judges to base departures on
discouraged factors only in “exceptional” cases.44 A defendant’s family
ties are not typically considered relevant in sentencing departures and
thus are analyzed under this standard.45
B. The Effects of Imprisonment on a Defendant’s Family Members and
Dependents
For defendants convicted and sentenced under the Guidelines,
incarceration affects not only their own lives but the lives of their family
members and dependents as well.46 Families often suffer intense
factors that are encouraged in sentencing consideration). Courts may also depart upwards
from the Guidelines in limited circumstances where “aggravating factors [are] associated
with the defendant’s conduct such as death, physical injury, extreme psychological injury,
abduction or unlawful restraint.” Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 701–02.
42
Koon, 518 U.S. at 93. Prohibited factors include “race, sex, national origin, creed,
religion, socioeconomic status,” “lack of guidance as a youth,” “drug or alcohol
dependence,” and “economic hardship.” Id.
43
Id. at 95. Because encouraged factors entail circumstances that the Commission may
have taken into account when formulating a guideline, a court may also take these factors
into account when it finds that the applicable guideline has not. Id. at 94–95. The
Guidelines encourage departures based on mitigating factors, including “the victim’s
conduct, lesser harm, coercion and duress, voluntary disclosure of an undiscovered
offense, or diminished capacity in the commission of a nonviolent offense.” Sentencing
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 697–99.
44
See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95 (providing a brief overview of the Commission’s commentary
concerning discouraged factors). The Guidelines discourage departures based on the
defendant’s “age; educational or vocational skills; mental and emotional conditions;
physical condition (including drug abuse or dependence); gambling addiction;
employment record; family ties and responsibilities; and military, civic, charitable, or
public service.” Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 697 n.2101.
45
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012); see infra Part
II.C (discussing family ties departures under the Guidelines).
46
See, e.g., Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 793,
811–15 (2011); Kimberly L. Alderman, The Long Arm of the Law: Incarceration and the
Ordinary Family, 55 HOW. L.J. 293, 294–96 (2012); Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, “It’s a
Family Affair”—The Incarceration of the American Family: Confronting Legal and Social Issues,
28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 271, 277–84 (1994); Eleanor Bush, Considering the Defendant’s Children at
Sentencing, 2 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 194–98 (1990); Susan E. Ellingstad, Note, The Sentencing
Guidelines: Downward Departures Based on a Defendant’s Extraordinary Family Ties and
Responsibilities, 76 MINN. L. REV. 957, 980–81 (1992). This impact is especially prevalent
today as imprisonment rates have more than tripled in the last thirty years, with the prison
population reaching its highest pinnacle in 2007 with one in every one hundred adult
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emotional, financial, and physical difficulties upon the separation from a
loved one due to incarceration.47 Specifically, incarceration of a family
member severely impacts the individual’s children because the loss of a
parent often damages a child’s psychological and financial well-being.48
citizens incarcerated. Alderman, supra, at 294; see Key Facts at a Glance, Imprisonment Rate
Data Table, BUREAU JUST. STATS., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/
incrttab.cfm (last updated Sept. 31, 2011) (showing that 139 in every 100,000 adult citizens
were incarcerated in 1980 compared to 502 in every 100,000 incarcerated in 2009); see also
PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010 2 tbl.1 (2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf (showing that 506 in every 100,000
adult citizens were incarcerated in 2007).
47
Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 280–81. Brooks and Bahna explain that inmates’
families suffer harsh economic difficulties in losing the few resources at their disposal
because incarceration often affects those families in the lowest socioeconomic position in
society. Id. at 280. These families are also physically affected when forced to move from
their homes and closer to those who are incarcerated. Id. In addition to physical family
separation, incarceration of loved ones leads to family members feeling isolated while
trying to cope with their loss. Id. at 281. Another critic poses that the exponential increase
in imprisonment over the last thirty years has resulted in incarceration touching the lives of
“all ordinary families” rather than only those that are socioeconomically disadvantaged.
Alderman, supra note 46, at 294. Alderman also explains that incarceration of one family
member disrupts the family unit as a whole. Id. The private family sphere is intruded
upon because family contact and support are regulated by the state while the family
member is incarcerated. Id. at 294–95. Further, the incarcerated family member’s
desocialization often leads to high divorce rates and further family disruption. Id. at 295;
Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 283.
48
Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 812. In 2007, the number of minors with a parent in
prison increased 79% since 1991 to a total of roughly 1.7 million minors affected. LAUREN
E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2008), available at
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf; SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING
PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN: TRENDS 1991–2007, at 2 (2009),
available at http://sentengingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_incarcerated
parents.pdf. That number represented 2.3% of minors in the United States. GLAZE &
MARUSCHAK, supra, at 1. Between 1991 and 2007, the number of mothers in prison has
grown 122% and the number of fathers in prison by 76%. SCHIRMER ET AL., supra, at 2. One
critic notes that the effects of parental incarceration are most detrimental when a child is
young but that the loss of a parent to incarceration is detrimental to a child at any age
because he or she may experience behavior problems, low self-esteem, difficulty in school,
and difficulty in maintaining relationships when older. Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 812.
Thus, dependents with special needs would face additional difficulty in coping with a
parent’s incarceration. King, supra note 11, at 305–06. Further, incarceration of the parent
who provides primary financial support will cause extreme financial difficulties for the
child. Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 812; see GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra, at 17 app. tbl.9
(showing that 67.2% of federal inmates provided primary financial support to their
children and that 54% of state inmates provided primary financial support to their children
in 2004). Another critic recognizes that children of incarcerated parents often experience
behavior problems similar to children whose parents die or divorce. Brooks & Bahna, supra
note 46, at 281. This feeling of loss may cause children to experience educational and
emotional problems, as well as feelings of anger and embarrassment. Id. at 281–82.
However, Abramowicz recognizes that a parent’s incarceration may benefit a child,
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Children of incarcerated parents are more likely to face incarceration
later in life as well.49 Although the defendant’s incarceration is seen as
just punishment for the crimes committed, the effect of his or her
imprisonment is often viewed as inflicting unwarranted harm on
innocent family members.50
Under the Guidelines, courts may consider the impact of
incarceration on the defendant’s family members in determining the

especially in cases involving a history of abuse or criminal activity. Abramowicz, supra
note 46, at 812; see SCHIRMER ET AL., supra, at 6 (“In some instances, such as a child living in
a home where substance abuse was prevalent, the incarceration of a parent may actually
result in a more stable environment for the child if a responsible relative is able to take on
the child’s care.”).
49
Alderman, supra note 46, at 295; Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 282; see also Deseriee
A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & the State: The Construction of a New Family Ideology,
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 93 (2011) (noting that children of incarcerated parents
have a higher chance of being incarcerated as adults); Tiffany J. Jones, Comment, Neglected
by the System: A Call for Equal Treatment for Incarcerated Fathers and Their Children—Will
Father Absenteeism Perpetuate the Cycle of Criminality?, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 87, 97 (2002)
(providing that male youths whose fathers have been incarcerated are at an increased risk
of incarceration). Kennedy notes that children of incarcerated parents are more likely than
other children at the same socioeconomic level to engage in criminal activity. Kennedy,
supra, at 93. Further, children of incarcerated parents are also “more likely to engage in
drug use, early sexual activity, and truancy” compared to children whose parents are not
incarcerated. Id. Kennedy further notes that although these consequences may be due in
part to the loss of the incarcerated parent, the issues experienced by the children could also
be attributed to the child’s placement in foster care. Id.
50
See Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 838 (“[C]hildren are ‘innocents,’ and as such do not
deserve to be punished for the ‘sins’ of their parents.”); Alderman, supra note 46, at 294–96
(discussing the harm to the family caused by an individual’s incarceration); Brooks &
Bahna, supra note 46, at 277–84 (discussing harm to the family when one of its members is
incarcerated); Bush, supra note 46, at 194–98 (discussing the harm to a defendant’s children
upon incarceration); Ellingstad, supra note 46, at 980–81 (discussing the harm of
incarceration to the family). In addition to family harm, critics also focus on the general
harm to society stemming from incarceration. Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 284–85;
Ellingstad, supra note 46, at 980–81. According to Brooks & Bahna, society bears the cost of
incarceration because children of inmates are more likely to engage in criminal activity.
Brooks & Bahan, supra note 46, at 284. Further, society must bear the financial cost of
supporting the inmate’s children or spouse through the public welfare system. Id.; see
SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 48, at 9 (discussing the risk that inmates will lose their parental
rights due to incarceration). Finally, society bears the cost of incarceration due to the high
rate of recidivism among parent offenders. Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 285.
Ellingstad similarly recognizes that society bears the cost of foster care, permanent family
dissolution where the court terminates a parent offender’s parental rights, and dependence
on government aid where the family’s primary financial source is incarcerated. Ellingstad,
supra note 46, at 981. In light of these costs, Ellingstad argues that courts should weigh the
cost of incarceration against the benefit of incarceration when determining whether to
depart based on family ties. Id. at 980–81.
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appropriate sentence.51 Such consideration provides sentencing judges
with discretion to consider the defendant’s family in light of the
additional harm that incarceration may inflict on society, the family, and
the defendant himself.52 However, such a system inherently creates an
opportunity for the imposition of a lesser sentence, potential unfairness,
and abuse of such system by parents because the likelihood of deterrence
has been reduced.53 Sentencing judges often recognize the tension
51
See infra Part II.C (discussing downward departures from the Guidelines based on the
defendant’s family ties and responsibilities); see also infra note 57 (providing the text of
Guidelines section 5H1.6 addressing departures based on family ties and responsibilities).
52
See Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 835–40 (detailing arguments in favor of family
consideration in sentencing due to the additional harms inflicted on the defendant’s family
and the defendant himself); Bush, supra note 46, at 195 (providing the principles driving
consideration of the defendant’s children at sentencing); Raeder, supra note 11, at 698–704
(advocating for judicial focus on the effect of incarceration to the family). Bush argues that
the purposes of the criminal justice system, including deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation, support consideration of the defendant’s children at sentencing because the
judge must weigh the cost of the sentence against its social benefit in achieving those goals.
Bush, supra note 46, at 194. Bush further claims that the SRA condones consideration of the
defendant’s family at sentencing. Id. at 195. Finally, Bush claims that consideration of the
defendant’s family would promote consistency in sentencing and would effectuate the least
punitive sentence required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 194–95; see infra note 93
(providing the text of the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). In Bush’s
view, a parent’s sentence of incarceration is not equal to that of a non-parent because of the
impact that sentence will have on the inmate’s children. Bush, supra note 46, at 194.
Further, because parental incarceration would inflict additional punishment compared to
nonparent inmates, § 3553(a) requires the court to consider family circumstances so that the
punishment is no greater than necessary. Id. at 195.
53
See Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 840–42 (presenting arguments against considering
the interests of the defendant’s children in sentencing); Douglas A. Berman, Addressing
Why: Developing Principled Rationales for Family-Based Departures, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 274,
274 (2001) (“[I]t is difficult to provide a principled explanation for exactly why a criminal
offender should merit a lesser punishment simply because he or she has a spouse or
children or other relatives.”). Abramowicz also recognizes arguments that claim there is
nothing inherently unfair in failing to consider a defendant’s family at sentencing because
the defendant could easily have avoided or foreseen those detrimental consequences to his
or her family. Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 841. In line with this argument, skeptics
further argue that taking a defendant’s family into consideration during sentencing fails to
deter parents from engaging in criminal activity and may actually encourage such activity.
Id. Finally, critics argue that this standard would undermine the entire legitimacy of
criminal law by immunizing parents from penal consequences. Id. at 842; see, e.g., United
States v. Norton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that the female
defendant’s family circumstances were extraordinary where the defendant was the sole
caregiver for two young children and also assisted her nineteen-year-old son with college
expenses and health insurance); United States v. Dyce, 975 F. Supp. 17, 22 (D.D.C. 1997)
(holding that the female defendant’s family circumstances were extraordinary where the
defendant was the sole caretaker of her three children); see also United States v. Cage, 451
F.3d 585, 596 (10th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that to consider the effects of a single mother’s
incarceration on her children “would effectively immunize single mothers from criminal
sanction aside from supervised release”); United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir.
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between addressing the effect of the defendant’s incarceration on family
ties and ensuring that the defendant does not receive a lesser sentence
based on the mere presence of those family ties.54 Any system that
allows significant judicial discretion creates an inherent lack of
uniformity and requires a consistent and well-informed departure
standard for courts to effectively strike a balance in sentencing
decisions.55
C. Downward Departures Based on Family Ties and Responsibilities
Guidelines section 5H1.6 provides for sentencing departures based
on a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities.56 Family ties, however,
are considered a discouraged factor in determining whether the
circumstances warrant a downward departure.57 In Koon v. United States,
the Supreme Court first established the standard by which district courts
should analyze whether a discouraged factor would warrant departure
in any given case.58 The standard was widely criticized as being
2002) (“[S]ingle mother status is not an ‘idiosyncratic’ circumstance, distinguishing her case
from the ‘mine-run.’” (quoting United States v. ChestnaChestna, 962 962 F.2d 103, 107103,
107 (1st Cir. 1992))); United States v. Patterson, 17 F. App’x 496, 497 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the defendant’s status as a single mother of an infant was not extraordinary enough to
remove the case from the “heartland” of the applicable guideline); United States v. Brand,
907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today’s society,
and imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the parent from the children.”).
54
Compare United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL 1302577, at
*6 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007) (“The Court believes that the focus of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 is on the
loss of caretaking and financial support for the defendant’s family that a defendant’s
incarceration would cause.”), with United States v. Justice, No. CR 09 3078 JB, 2012 WL
394455, at *11 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2012) (“Many defendants whom the Court sentences to a
term of imprisonment have young children. . . . This pattern is a common one that appears
before the Court.”), and United States v. Tilga, No. CR 09 0865 JB, 2012 WL 1192526, at *3
(D.N.M. Apr. 5, 2012) (“[T]he court sees many defendants with children, and . . . must put
these circumstances into context. . . . Children often suffer from the choices their parents
make . . . .”).
55
See infra Part IV (providing recommended amendments to the Guidelines to reflect a
uniform standard for family ties and departures that would include objective factors).
56
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012).
57
Id. The relevant policy statement provides: “[i]n sentencing a defendant . . . family
ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure
may be warranted.” Id.
58
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95–96 (1996). The Court stated that in considering
discouraged factors, courts could depart on this basis where “the factor is present to an
exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case
where the factor is present.” Id. at 96. The Court also clarified that where the factor is
forbidden courts may not consider that factor in sentencing. Id. at 95–96. Further the Court
directed judges to consider encouraged factors in sentencing where such factor is not
already taken into account by the applicable guideline. Id. at 96. Finally, the Court stated
that “‘after considering the structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and
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unworkable and vague, resulting in differing interpretations among the
federal courts when applying it.59 Although the Guidelines have since
undergone amendments, namely the Feeney Amendment pursuant to
the PROTECT Act and the now advisory role of the Guidelines under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, district courts have maintained a
similar family ties departure standard.60
Part II.C.1 first provides the general departure standard handed
down by the Supreme Court in Koon and looks to the way in which
district courts interpreted that standard in the realm of family ties
departures.61 Part II.C.2 then provides an overview of the amendments
to the Guidelines pursuant to the PROTECT Act and the Supreme
Court’s decision in Booker.62 Finally, Part II.C.2 also looks to the way in
which these amendments have affected district courts’ family ties
departure analysis.63
1.

The Guidelines Departure Standard Under Koon

In Koon, the Supreme Court suggested a multi-step analysis to guide
district courts in determining whether a departure from the applicable
sentencing guideline is warranted.64 According to Koon, the sentencing
judge should first consider whether unusual factual circumstances exist
the Guidelines taken as a whole,’” courts must decide whether an unmentioned factor
sufficiently takes the case out of the heartland. Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994
F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)).
59
See, e.g., Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 73–74 (attributing the circuit split
regarding family ties and responsibility departures to the vague heartland concept
provided in Koon); Shoenberg, supra note 11, at 294 (describing the distinction in Koon
between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” as a “mission impossible” (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
60
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the Guidelines, as
amended, are now effectively advisory); see also infra note 87 and accompanying text
(providing the text of the amendments to 2003 Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the
2003 PROTECT Act).
61
See infra Part II.C.1 (providing the Supreme Court’s analysis in Koon as well as the
district courts’ departure standards following that decision).
62
See infra Part II.C.2 (providing an overview of amendments made to the Guidelines
pursuant to the PROTECT Act and Booker).
63
See infra Part II.C.2 (providing examples of family ties departure standards among the
district courts following amendment to the Guidelines).
64
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95–96 (1996). The Supreme Court in Koon also
explained that the proper standard of review for departure decisions was abuse of
discretion. Id. at 100. The Court reasoned that “[a] district court’s decision to depart from
the Guidelines . . . will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the
traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court.” Id. at 98. Behind its rationale, the
Court noted that “[d]istrict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in
making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines cases
than appellate courts do.” Id.
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in a given case, so as to take it out of the “heartland” of typical cases.65 If
the circumstances render the case atypical, the sentencing court should
then consider whether the Commission forbids, encourages, or
discourages departures on the basis of the factors presented.66 The Court
further explained that the sentencing judge should not grant a departure
if the circumstances fall within one of the Commission’s prohibited
categories.67 However, a sentencing court may depart on the basis of
encouraged factors if those circumstances have not already been
adequately taken into account in formulating the applicable guideline.68
Finally, a sentencing court may depart on the basis of discouraged
factors when the factual circumstances separate the case from typical
cases involving that factor or when the discouraged factor is present to
an “exceptional degree.”69
The Commission has never considered a criminal defendant’s family
ties as a relevant offender characteristic for the purposes of sentencing.70
65
Id. at 95. The Koon Court recommended district courts compare the present case to
other similar Guidelines cases when determining whether the circumstances are sufficient
to remove it from the “heartland.” Id. at 98.
66
Id.; see supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing departures based on
prohibited, encouraged, and discouraged factors). Despite the Court’s instructions in Koon,
district courts developed different standards of analysis for determining departures. See,
e.g., United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (considering first
whether the court possesses the power to depart based on the defendant’s family
circumstances, then, whether the court should exercise its discretion to depart by balancing
the defendant’s family circumstances against statutory concerns, and finally, to what extent
the court should depart in light of policy considerations); United States v. Colp, 249 F.
Supp. 2d 740, 742 (E.D. Va. 2003) (setting forth an expounded version of the Koon analysis);
United States v. Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (considering first the
defendant’s family circumstances, then whether a departure from the applicable guideline
would spare unnecessary family hardship, and finally the purposes of sentencing).
67
Koon, 518 U.S. at 95–96; see supra note 42 (listing those factors the Commission
prohibits for sentencing consideration).
68
Koon, 518 U.S. at 96; see supra note 43 (listing factors the Commission encourages for
sentencing consideration).
69
Koon, 518 U.S. at 96; see supra note 44 (listing factors the Commission discourages for
sentencing consideration). The Court informed district courts to apply the same standard
to cases in which encouraged factors, those already taken into account by the applicable
guideline, removed the case from the norm. Koon, 518 U.S. at 96. The Court further
advised courts that when an unmentioned factor is present in the facts of a case, the
sentencing court should decide whether or not it removes the case from the heartland so
that a departure is warranted. Id. According to the Court, sentencing courts should
consider the purpose behind the Guidelines as well as the Commission’s expectation that
unmentioned factors will very rarely warrant departure when making this determination.
Id.
70
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012) (“In sentencing
a defendant . . . family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a departure may be warranted.”). In the first Guidelines manual, the Commission
similarly provided that “[f]amily ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in
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Thus, under the Koon analysis, family ties are a discouraged sentencing
factor.71 In applying the Koon standard, the district court must find that
family circumstances are extraordinary enough to remove the case from
the “heartland” of cases encompassed by the applicable sentencing
range, thus permitting a downward departure.72 However, despite the
SRA’s goal of increased sentencing uniformity, drawing the line between
ordinary and extraordinary under the Koon standard proved difficult.73
determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines.” U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (1987). This language was slightly changed
in the 1991 manual, although its categorization of family ties departures as discouraged
remained the same. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement
(1991) (“Family ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.”). In 2005, the
Commission adopted language in the family ties and responsibilities policy statement that
is currently used in today’s Guidelines manual. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 5H1.6 policy statement (2005) (“In sentencing a defendant . . . family ties and
responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be
warranted.”).
71
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012) (providing
that family ties and responsibilities are not “ordinarily relevant” in determining downward
departures from the Guidelines); see also United States v. Carrasco, 271 F.3d 765, 768 (8th
Cir. 2001) (“Family responsibility is generally a disfavored reason for granting a
departure.”). Prior to the amendment discussed in the preceding footnote, the standard for
departures based on a defendant’s family ties under the Guidelines provided that,
“[f]amily ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2000); see supra note 44 and accompanying text
(categorizing a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities as a discouraged factor under
the Guidelines). For a discussion of amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 made
pursuant to the PROTECT Act, see infra Part II.C.2.
72
Compare United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2002) (reasoning that only
atypical cases falling outside of the “heartland” of cases encompassed in the applicable
guideline warrant a downward departure), with United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d
289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that a district court has discretion to depart when the
defendant’s family circumstances are “extraordinary”). The Court’s “heartland” departure
standard in Koon has received criticism for its lack of guidance and definitiveness. See
Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 79–88 (discussing the issues apparent in departures
since Koon); Shoenberg, supra note 11, at 294–95 (criticizing the problematic expectation that
courts differentiate between the ordinary and the extraordinary in determining whether a
family ties and responsibilities departure is warranted).
73
See Goldmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 74–78 (discussing differing court
interpretations of “ordinary” family circumstances under Koon). Goldsmith & Porter
identify three categories of sentencing court standards for family ties departures after Koon.
Id. The first category of family ties departures involve cases in which the defendant is a
single parent who typically lacks the availability of other family members or suitable
caretakers. Id. at 75. The second category includes those defendants in a two-parent
household. Id. at 75–76. Goldsmith & Porter note that departures within the second
category vary widely and unpredictably as they are analyzed under a very fact specific
inquiry. Id at 76. Finally, the third category includes those defendants who care for third
parties other than their children, such as a spouse, parent, or sibling. Id. at 77.
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Several differing standards for “extraordinary” family circumstances
arose among and within the federal circuits following the Court’s
decision.74
The Third Circuit adopted a fairly broad family ties departure
standard by requiring that sentencing judges find the defendant’s family
circumstances take the case out of the ordinary.75 The Fourth Circuit, on
the other hand, set forth a more narrow family ties departure standard.76
For instance, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
determined that a family’s significant economic hardship upon a
defendant’s imprisonment, standing alone, as well as a family member’s
illness, standing alone, are not sufficient to warrant a departure based on
Accordingly, the Fourth
“extraordinary” family circumstances.77
Circuit’s narrow departure standard for extraordinary family ties under
Koon required the combined presence of serious medical and financial
family circumstances to render the defendant’s family responsibilities
“unique.”78
74
See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text (discussing the different family ties
departures standards among district courts following Koon). Another critic identified three
basic standards under which departures based on family ties fell after the Koon decision.
Farrell, supra note 11, at 271–72. Under the first standard, Farrell notes that a district court
simply considers whether the family circumstance is “extraordinary.” Id. at 271. Under the
second category, the district court considers whether the impact of the defendant’s
incarceration within the applicable guideline on his or her family is exceptional. Id. at 271–
72. Finally, under the third category, Farrell notes that district courts utilize a more lax
standard in considering whether the family circumstance is “substantial.” Id. at 272; see
supra note 31 (providing a brief overview of the SRA’s objectives, including increased
sentencing uniformity in response to wide sentencing disparities).
75
See United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he term
‘extraordinary’ . . . retains its literal meaning: the circumstances of the case must simply
place it outside the ordinary.”). The court further explained that departures based on
family ties and responsibilities do not require circumstances that are “extra-ordinary by any
particular degree of magnitude.” Id. The court slightly limited its standard by further
providing that family ties departures may not be granted on the basis of “generic concerns
regarding breaking up families.” Id. at 196–97.
76
See United States v. Colp, 249 F. Supp. 2d 740, 742 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“The Fourth Circuit
has narrowly construed downward departures based on family ties.”); United States v.
Velez, 249 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The Fourth Circuit has narrowly construed
downward departures based on family ties.”).
77
Colp, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 742; Velez, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 721.
78
See Velez, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (finding that a combination of “life-threatening illness
and economic hardship” constitutes “exceptional” family circumstances). In Velez, the
defendant requested a family ties departure because of his position as the sole financial
provider for his wife and four children. Id. at 720. The defendant’s wife became
unemployed after she developed clinical depression and post-traumatic stress disorder
following the tragic death of their ten-month old child, and she was also diagnosed with
cervical cancer, which required extensive treatment. Id. The court held that the departure
was warranted because the combination of family financial hardship and serious medical
issues constituted “unique” family circumstances justifying departure. Id. at 722; see also
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In the Second Circuit, various grounds arose for determining
whether a defendant’s family circumstances are sufficiently
extraordinary to warrant departure.79 For example, the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York broadly categorized
“extraordinary” family circumstances as those that would bring
“exceptional hardship” to the family upon the defendant’s incarceration
under the Guidelines.80 However, the same court later construed these
circumstances more narrowly by permitting departure where minor
dependents uniquely rely on the defendant’s continuous financial and
emotional support.81
Differing grounds for family ties departures also arose within the
Seventh Circuit.82 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Colp, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 743–45 (granting a family ties departure where the defendant was
the sole caretaker and provider for her disabled husband who required constant care due
to his limited mental and physical capabilities after surviving a severe automobile
accident).
79
See, e.g., United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Family
circumstances are extraordinary when exceptional hardship to a defendant’s family would
result from a sentence within the Guidelines range.”); United States v. Robles, 331 F. Supp.
2d 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (providing that family circumstances are sufficiently
exceptional only when the defendant’s family is “’uniquely dependant [sic]’” on the
continuation of the defendant’s financial and emotional responsibilities (quoting United
States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528, 535 (2d Cir. 1998))); United States v. Ayala, 75 F. Supp. 2d 126,
137 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (providing that family circumstances warrant departure when the
defendant provides a “unique source of financial and/or emotional support for a significant
number of dependents”(emphasis added)).
80
White, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 294; see supra note 79 and accompanying text (providing the
standard for extraordinary family circumstances in White); see also United States v. Johnson,
964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Nor do we find any reason to believe that family
circumstances warranting departure must include something beyond extraordinary
parental responsibilities.”). In explaining its family ties departures standard, the court in
White explained that some family hardship resulting from a defendant’s imprisonment is
inherent and therefore is not out of the ordinary. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 294. In White,
the defendant was a single mother of five children, ages five to thirteen, and had legal
custody of her fourteen-year-old sister. Id. at 291. The court granted the defendant’s
motion to depart based on family ties, finding that the loss of six children to the state foster
care system would bring about extraordinary hardship to the family. Id. at 295–96.
81
Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 221; see supra note 79 and accompanying text (providing the
standard for extraordinary family circumstances set forth in Robles). In Robles, the
defendant provided “significant care” for his father, who had undergone two open-heart
surgeries, wore a pacemaker, and suffered from seizures. Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 220–21.
The court held that the defendant’s family circumstances did not warrant departure
because the defendant’s father, rather than minor dependents, would be affected
negatively by the defendant’s imprisonment. Id. at 221.
82
See United States v. Owens, 145 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 1998) (analyzing whether the
defendant’s family circumstances were sufficiently atypical to remove the case from the
heartland); United States v. Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d 952, 961 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (holding that
“the defendant must show that the harm to his children will be greater than in the typical
case” to warrant departure (emphasis added)); United States v. Savulescu, No. 95 CR 511-2,
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Wisconsin framed its standard for “extraordinary” family circumstances
around the effect of a defendant’s incarceration on his or her children.83
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on the other
hand, more broadly considered the effect of a defendant’s sentence on
general family members under its “extraordinary” family circumstances
standard.84 In addition to district courts’ interpretations under Koon, the
PROTECT Act and the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker provided
further context for interpretations of family ties departures under the
newly advisory Guidelines.85
2.

The PROTECT Act and the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines

Congress, in conjunction with the PROTECT Act of 2003, passed the
Feeney Amendment in an effort to curtail departures and prevent
sentencing judges from circumventing the Guidelines.86 As a result,
2002 WL 745787, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2002) (“In making a finding of extraordinary family
circumstances, the court must find that ‘the period of incarceration set by the Guidelines
would have an effect on the family or family members beyond the disruption to family and
parental relationships that would be present in the usual case.’” (emphasis added) (quoting
United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 907 (7th Cir. 1994))).
83
Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 961; see supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing the
standard for family ties and responsibilities departures in Maas). In Maas, the defendant
was convicted of “transferring a firearm to a felon” and “transporting in interstate
commerce wildlife taken in violation of state law.” Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 953–54. At
sentencing, the defendant asked for a downward departure on the basis of family ties. Id.
at 960. The court held that the defendant’s family circumstances were not sufficiently
unusual to justify a downward departure. Id. at 961. The court reasoned that the
defendant’s Guidelines sentence would not negatively impact his children to a significant
degree because the defendant’s wife was still available to parent and financially support
the children during the defendant’s incarceration. Id.; see United States v. Pearson, 282 F.
Supp. 2d 941, 943 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (“[When] confronted with a motion based on family
circumstances . . . the court should consider whether the guideline range is such that a
reasonable departure will spare the defendant’s family from unnecessary hardship.”).
84
Savulescu, 2002 WL 745787, at *1; see supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing
the standard for family ties and responsibilities departures in Savulescu). In Savulescu, the
defendant moved for a family ties departure as the sole caretaker and source of financial
support for his wife, who suffered from severe and chronic bipolar disorder. Savulescu,
2002 WL 745787, at *1, *3. The court held that the defendant’s circumstances warranted a
departure because his wife’s mental illness prevented her from caring for herself medically
and financially. Id. at *3. The court further reasoned that the defendant’s wife would lose
the benefit of the defendant’s insurance, which covered her medical costs, and that no one
else was available to care for his wife upon the defendant’s incarceration. Id.
85
See infra Part II.C.2 (explaining the impact of the PROTECT Act and Booker on the
Guidelines and district courts’ interpretations of family ties departures thereafter).
86
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Becky Gregory & Traci Kenner, A New Era in Federal
Sentencing, 68 TEX. B.J. 796, 798 (2005). Most notably, the PROTECT Act changed the
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Guidelines section 5H1.6 regarding family ties departures underwent
amendment.87 Pursuant to the PROTECT Act, the Commission included

standard of review for departure decisions from the Koon abuse of discretion standard to a
de novo standard. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today (PROTECT) Act § 401(d)(2) (“[T]he court of appeals shall review de novo
the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”). The Guidelines also note
that “[t]he PROTECT Act . . . directs the Commission, not later than 180 days after the
enactment of the Act, to promulgate . . . appropriate amendments to the sentencing
guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary to ensure that the incidence of
downward departures is substantially reduced.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
app. C, vol. II, amend. 651 (2003).
87
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2003) (noting that
“Section 401(b)(4) of Public Law 108-21 (the “Protect Act”) directly amended Section 5H1.6
to add the [commentary], effective April 30, 2003”). The amendment added an application
note that reads:
1. Circumstances to Consider.—
(A) In General.—In determining whether a departure is
warranted under this policy statement, the court shall
consider the following non-exhaustive list of circumstances:
(i) The seriousness of the offense.
(ii) The involvement in the offense, if any, of
members of the defendant’s family.
(iii) The danger, if any, to members of the
defendant’s family as a result of the offense.
(B) Departures Based on Loss of Caretaking or Financial
Support.—A departure under this policy statement based on
loss of caretaking or financial support of the defendant’s
family requires, in addition to the court’s consideration of
the non-exhaustive list of circumstances in subdivision (A),
the presence of the following circumstances:
(i) The defendant’s service of a sentence within
the applicable guideline range will cause a
substantial, direct, and specific loss of
essential caretaking, or essential financial
support, to the defendant’s family.
(ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support
substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily
incident to incarceration for a similarly
situated defendant. . . .
(iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is
one for which no effective remedial or
ameliorative programs reasonably are
available, making the defendant’s caretaking
or financial support irreplaceable to the
defendant’s family.
(iv) The departure effectively will address the
loss of caretaking or financial support.
Id. The Guidelines note that the addition of these criteria imposes a duty on courts to
“conduct certain more rigorous analyses.” Id. at app. C, vol. II, amend. 651. The
Guidelines further note that the addition of factors pertaining to departures based on loss
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an application note for sentencing courts determining family ties
departures in order to guide judges.88 According to the amendment,
judges are to consider the seriousness of the offense at hand, the
involvement of any of the defendant’s family members in the offense,
and any danger to the defendant’s immediate family members as a result
of the offense when determining whether departure is warranted.89 The
application note also restricts family ties departures based specifically on
loss of caretaking and financial support to situations involving four
circumstances: (1) a sentence within the applicable guideline range will
cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential caretaking or
essential financial support to the defendant’s family; (2) such loss
exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration; (3) the defendant’s
caretaking or financial support is irreplaceable to his or her family
because remedial or ameliorative programs are not reasonably available;
and (4) the departure would effectively address the loss.90 Although the
amended commentary provides more guidance to sentencing judges
applying section 5H1.6, the commentary does not restrict courts’ analysis
to these factors in every case.91
The Guidelines underwent further change pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Booker, where the Court directed federal judges to
consider the Guidelines as advisory, rather than mandatory, when
determining a criminal defendant’s sentence.92 In the wake of Booker,
of caretaking or financial support establishes “heightened criteria” for family ties
departures. Id.
88
See supra note 87 and accompanying text (providing the amendments to Guidelines
section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act).
89
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (2012)
(“The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a
‘heartland,’ a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guidelines describes.”);
supra note 87 and accompanying text (providing the amendments to Guidelines section
5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act).
90
See supra note 87 and accompanying text (providing the amendments to Guidelines
section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act). The Guidelines further note that “[t]he
Commission believes that these general policy changes, working together, will
substantially reduce the incidence of downward departures.”
U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, at app. C, vol. II, amend. 651 (2003).
91
E.g., United States v. Davis, No. 3 06 cr 111 (JCH), 2006 WL 2165717, at *1 (D. Conn.
July 31, 2006). In Davis, the court noted that a defendant’s family circumstances must be
“exceptional” to warrant departure, but in the event that the defendant argues specifically
for departure based on “loss of caretaking or financial support” the court should look to
the additional factors in Guidelines section 5H1.6 added pursuant to the PROTECT Act.
Id.; see supra note 87 and accompanying text (providing the amendments to Guidelines
section 5H1.6).
92
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259–65 (2005). The Court in Booker held that the
sentencing statute provision mandating district court judges to sentence within the
applicable range was unconstitutional. See id. at 245 (finding 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)
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district courts faced confusion in attempting to utilize the “effectively
However,
advisory” Guidelines in sentencing determinations.93

incompatible with the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that juries find facts relevant to
sentencing rather than judges). The Court also invalidated the sentencing statute provision
that provided the de novo appellate standard of review and replaced it with the
“reasonableness” standard. See id. at 259, 261 (finding 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) incompatible
with the Sixth Amendment). Justice Breyer, writing for the majority of the court in part,
explained that the Guidelines, as amended to sever and excise these provisions, are
advisory in nature and instructed district judges to consider the applicable sentencing
range while “tailor[ing] the sentence in light of other statutory concerns.” Id. at 245. Such
concerns include the need for the sentence to “reflect the seriousness of the offense,
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect
the public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training and medical care.” Id. at 245, 260. Although the Guidelines are advisory for
federal courts, sentences falling well outside of the applicable range are not afforded a
presumption of reasonableness. United States v. Vigil, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1266 (D.N.M.
2007).
93
See Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the “Heartland”: Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal
Guidelines, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 675, 687–94 (2011) (discussing courts’ reaction to the advisory
Guidelines post-Booker). The Court’s decision in Booker placed emphasis on 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553 as providing the central framework for federal sentencing under the advisory
Guidelines. Id. at 688. In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 provides:
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE.—The court
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary. . . . The court, in determining the particular sentence to
be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for
the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of
the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with the needed educational
or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range
established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the
guidelines . . .
(5) any pertinent policy statement—
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission . . .
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct; and
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subsequent Supreme Court decisions helped to clarify the role of the
Guidelines in sentencing post-Booker.94 In light of these decisions, the
(7)

the need to provide restitution to any victims of
the offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). However, the Commission proposed that the fourth statutory
factor, “‘the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range’” established under Guidelines, be
the first step in determining sentences post-Booker. Hofer, supra, at 688. The Commission
argued that the Guidelines were already developed to comply with § 3553(a) and thus, the
Guidelines deserved “substantial weight” in application. Id. at 689. In practice, many
district courts took this approach. Id. at 688; see Frank O. Bowman, III, The Year of
Jubilee . . . Or Maybe Not: Some Preliminary Observations About the Operation of the Federal
Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 279, 290–94 (2006) (providing that some
courts recognized that Booker did not abolish the Guidelines nor did it make the Guidelines
voluntary); Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39
VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 719–34 (2005) (predicting Booker‘s effects on federal sentencing);
Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines: The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing
After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625, 631–37 (2007) (explaining the trend in
circuits post-Booker to continue to regard Guidelines sentences as presumptively
reasonable); Lee D. Heckman, Note, The Benefits of Departure Obsolescence: Achieving the
Purposes of Sentencing in the Post-Booker World, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 171–76 (2008)
(recognizing that a majority of circuits continued to calculate Guideline sentencing ranges
post-Booker); Sarah Millard, Survey, The Effect of Booker on Federal Sentence Modification
Proceedings: How the Tenth Circuit Got it Right in Rhodes, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 771, 771 (2010)
(arguing for the preservation of the mandatory Guidelines in modification actions).
94
See generally Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (expounding on the advisory
role of the Guidelines); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (expounding on the
advisory role of the Guidelines); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)
(expounding on the advisory role of the Guidelines). In Gall, the Supreme Court adopted a
“guidelines-first” approach and instructed district courts to “begin all sentencing
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. As a matter of
administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting
point and the initial benchmark.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (citation omitted); Hofer, supra note
93, at 688. Further, in Rita, the Court provided that appellate courts could presume
sentences within the applicable Guidelines range to be reasonable, but did not hold them to
this standard. Id. at 691. The Court in Rita noted that an assumption of reasonableness is
warranted because:
The Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the Sentencing
Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked
with the help of many others in the law enforcement community over
a long period of time. . . . [I]t is fair to assume that the Guidelines,
insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that
might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.
Rita, 551 U.S. at 349–50. However, in Kimbrough, the Court acknowledged that some
sentencing guidelines “do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic
institutional role.” Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109; Hofer, supra note 93, at 691. For example,
the Commission departed from its empirical research approach in determining sentencing
guidelines for drug offenses and instead looked to statutory mandatory minimum
sentences established by Congress. Id. at 692. In these instances, where the applicable
guideline is not the product of empirical research, the Court provided that it is not an abuse
of discretion for district courts to conclude that the guideline fails to achieve the sentencing
purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id.
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Commission amended section 1B.1, which provides “Application
Instructions,” to reflect a three-step approach used in determining a
defendant’s sentence.95 Under this approach, district courts should first
calculate the applicable Guideline range, then consider policy statements
and official commentary to determine whether departure is warranted,
and finally should consider the statutory sentencing factors enumerated
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether a variance from the
Guidelines is warranted.96
Following these amendments to the Guidelines, district courts have
continued to maintain differing family ties departure standards across
the circuits by utilizing the “extraordinary” standard set forth in Koon.97
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B.1 (2012) (providing a three-step
approach to determining a defendant’s sentence under the Guidleines). The Application
Instruction, effective November 1, 2010 provides:
(a) The court shall determine the kinds of sentence and the guideline
range as set forth in the guidelines . . .
(b) The court shall then consider Parts H and K of Chapter Five,
Specific Offender Characteristics and Departures, and any other
policy statements or commentary in the guidelines that might
warrant consideration in imposing sentence. . . .
(c) The court shall then consider the applicable factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) taken as a whole. . . .
Id. The Commission also added background commentary stating that, “[i]f, after step (c),
the court imposes a sentence that is outside the guidelines framework, such a sentence is
considered a ‘variance’.” Id. § 1B.1 cmt. background; Hofer, supra note 93, at 697. In an
explanatory note, the Commission explained that “‘[d]eparture’ is a term of art under the
Guidelines and refers only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set
out in the Guidelines” and that “[a] ‘variance’—i.e., a sentence outside the guideline range
other than as provided for in the Guidelines Manual—is considered by the court only after
departures have been considered.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at app. C, vol.
III, amend. 741 (2012) (quoting, in part, Izizarry v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 2198, 2202
(2008)); see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, No. CR 09 3078 JB, 2011 WL 6828055, at *4
(D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2011) (“A district court may also rely on the existence of family ties and
responsibilities in varying downward on a defendant’s sentence.”). In adopting this
framework, the Commission also acted in accordance with a majority of circuits in regards
to the three-step approach. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at app. C, vol. III,
amend. 741 (2012).
96
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B.1 (2012); see supra note 95 and
accompanying text (providing the three-step application instructions under the amended
Guidelines); see also supra note 93 (providing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
97
See supra note 69 and accompanying text (providing the “extraordinary” standard in
Koon); see also United States v. Williams, Cr. No. 6:07 cr 01207 GRA 1, 2012 WL 4813279, at
*1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (“[A] reduction in a defendant's sentence based on family ties and
responsibilities is discouraged, absent a finding that ‘the defendant's family ties or
responsibilities are extraordinary.’”(quoting United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 434 (4th
Cir. 1997))); United States v. Gonzelez-Lopez, No. CR 11 3002 JB, 2012 WL 3150350, at *11
(D.N.M. July 27, 2012) (“[U]nusual circumstances may be sufficiently extraordinary that
they are accepted as a basis for departure . . . .”); United States v. Tilga, No. CR 09 0865 JB,
2012 WL 1192526, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 5, 2012) (holding that the defendant’s family
95
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In the Tenth Circuit, certain district courts have maintained a fairly
broad family ties departure standard by requiring that the defendant’s
family circumstances fall outside of the ordinary spectrum of cases.98 On
the other hand, the Eighth Circuit follows a more narrow approach.99 In
adopting the Eighth Circuit’s departure approach, one district court
explained that the standard required that the defendant be
“unquestionably irreplaceable and critically necessary to effectively
provide for a significantly ill and innocent family member.”100 The

circumstances were within the “heartland” of typical cases); Unites States v. Sorto, No. CR
07-0158 JB, 2008 WL 4104121, at *3 (D.N.M. May 5, 2008) (“‘When used as the sole basis for
departure, family circumstances must be ‘extraordinary.’” (quoting United States v. Jones,
159 F.3d 492, 499 (10th Cir. 1998))); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 07-1602 JB,
2008 WL 2371564, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008) (“[Family] circumstances may be sufficiently
extraordinary that they are accepted as a basis for departure . . . .”); United States v.
Eriacho, No. CR 06 2168 JB, 2007 WL 6364848, at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 10, 2007) (“In
extraordinary circumstances . . . the court has the authority to depart downward [based on
family ties].”); United States v. Crawford, No. 07-CR-73, 2007 WL 2436764, at *7 (E.D. Wis.
Aug. 22, 2007) (“[W]hile family responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining
an appropriate sentence, they are a proper consideration when they are shown to be
extraordinary.”); United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL 1302577,
at *4 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007) (“[A] district court may depart based on family circumstances
‘only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case
different from the ordinary case where the factor is present.’” (quoting Koon v. United
States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996))); United States v. Davis, No. 3 06 cr 111 (JCH), 2006 WL
2165717, at *1 (D. Conn. July 31, 2006) (“[T]he court recognizes that it has discretion to
depart on the grounds of exceptional family circumstances.”); United States v. Bailey, 369 F.
Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (D. Neb. 2005) (“Before departing from the Guidelines, a sentencing
court first must determine whether a particular case presents features that ‘take it outside
the Guidelines' “heartland” and make of it a special, or unusual, case.’” (quoting Koon, 518
U.S. at 95)); United States v. Marinaro, No. CR 03 80 B W, 2005 WL 851334, at *5 (D. Me.
Apr. 13, 2005) (“The court should depart on [the] basis [of family ties] ‘only if the factor is
present to an exceptional degree . . . .’” (quoting, in part, Koon, 518 U.S. at 96)).
98
See Herrera-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 2371564, at *7 (“The requirement that the family
circumstances be extraordinary does not mean that they must be extra-extraordinary; they
must only be outside the ordinary.”); Eriacho, 2007 WL 6364848, at *4 (“The requirement
that the family circumstances be extraordinary does not mean that they must be extraextraordinary; they must only be outside the ordinary.”); United States v. Hendry, No. 0540151-01-SAC, 2006 WL 3497772, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 5, 2006) (“Family circumstances are
only considered in the most extraordinary situations. The defendant’s status as a single
mother is not such an extraordinary situation. . . . ‘[It] is unfortunately, not very
uncommon. . . .’” (citations omitted) (quoting, in part, United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585,
596 (10th Cir. 2006))).
99
See Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (adopting the Eight Circuit’s family ties departure
standard). The district court explained the Eighth Circuit’s family ties departure standard
as requiring that “the defendant's care for an innocent family member [be] unquestionably
irreplaceable and critically necessary to effectively provide for a significantly ill and
innocent family member.” Id.
100
Id. In adopting the Eighth Circuit’s standard, the district court tailored the standard
even more narrowly to classify an “innocent family member” as a child. Id. at 1102. The
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Fourth Circuit has adopted a similar standard, but only requires that the
defendant be “irreplaceable” without the additional context of caring for
an ill family member.101
The Guidelines themselves have also informed the courts’ family ties
departure analysis.102 For example, the Seventh Circuit utilizes the
section 5H1.6 commentary in determining whether a defendant’s family
ties are sufficiently “extraordinary” to warrant departure.103 Similarly,
court provided that “where a child is especially vulnerable and the defendant truly
irreplaceable to the child’s recovery, a departure is warranted.” Id.
101
See Williams, 2012 WL 4813279, at *1 (“[A] sentencing court may not depart downward
or reduce a sentence on [the basis of family ties] unless it finds that a defendant is
‘irreplacable’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 434 (4th Cir. 1997))). The
Fourth Circuit continues to rely on the standard expounded in Koon, namely that “a
defendant’s sentence based on family ties and responsibilities is discouraged, absent a
finding that ‘the defendant’s family ties or responsibilities are extraordinary.’” Id. (emphasis
added) (quoting Wilson, 114 F.3d at 434). However, in interpreting the meaning of
“extraordinary,” the Fourth Circuit explains that “a sentencing court may not depart
downward or reduce a sentence on this basis unless it finds that a defendant is
‘irreplaceable.’” Id. (quoting Elliot v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 769 (4th Cir. 2003)).
102
See Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764, at *7–8 (applying Guidelines section 5H1.6
commentary to determine whether the defendant’s family circumstances warranted
departure); Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *1–2 (applying Guidelines section 5H1.6
commentary to determine whether the defendant’s family circumstances warranted
departure). In Davis, the court considered whether:
(i) The defendant’s service of a sentence within the applicable
guideline range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of
essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant’s
family.
(ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support substantially exceeds
the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a similarly situated
defendant. . . .
(iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is one for which no
effective remedial or ameliorative programs reasonably are available,
making the defendant’s caretaking or financial support irreplaceable to
the defendant’s family.
(iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or
financial support.
Id.; see supra note 87 (providing amendments to the Guidelines section 5H1.6 commentary).
103
Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764, at *7–8; see supra note 87 (providing the amendments to
the Guidelines section 5H1.6 commentary). The court explained the Seventh Circuit
departure standard as this: “[W]hile family responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in
determining an appropriate sentence, they are a proper consideration when they are shown
to be extraordinary.” Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764 at *7 (emphasis added); see, e.g., United
States v. Capri, No. 03 CR 300-1, 2005 WL 1916720, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 5, 2005) (“A
defendant’s responsibilities to a child or an infirm family member properly may serve as a
basis for departure under the Guidelines, if the harm to the family member exceeds that
which a normal family member would experience from incarceration of a caregiver, and
care from other sources is not reasonable [sic] available to alleviate the harm.”). The court
went on to apply the standard to the defendant’s situation according to the factors
enumerated in Guidelines section 5H1.6. Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764, at *8; see United
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the Second Circuit utilizes section 5H1.6 for family ties departures as
well but has narrowed the language in a way that requires defendants to
show “particularly severe hardship” to the family upon their
incarceration.104
While family ties departure standards vary across the federal
circuits, a similar pattern exists between district courts within the same
circuit.105 Namely, district courts in the Tenth Circuit have varied widely
in applying the “extraordinary” standard to family ties departures, even
within a single district court over time.106 For example, in decisions
handed down in 2007 and 2008, the District Court for the District of New
Mexico broadly construed “extraordinary” family ties and
responsibilities to include those that are “outside the ordinary.”107
However, in two other decisions handed down in those same years, that
same district court more narrowly defined its family ties departure
standard to encompass situations where the defendant’s incarceration
has a substantially negative impact on his or her family members.108 The

States v. Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (applying the factors in
Guidelines section 5H1.6 to the defendant’s motion for downward departure based on
family ties and responsibilities).
104
Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *1–2 (quoting United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 119
(2d Cir. 2005)). In Davis, the court first recognized that Guidelines section 5H1.6 provided
the proper inquiry for the defendant’s claim. Id.; see also supra note 102 (providing the
language utilized by the court in Davis). However, in examining that language, the court
adopted the Second Circuit’s prevalent family ties departure standard, which provides that
“[a] departure . . . is not available ‘where other relatives could meet the family’s
needs . . . or the defendant’s absence did not cause a particularly severe hardship.’” Davis,
2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (emphasis added) (quoting Selioutsky, 409 F.3d at 119).
105
See infra notes 106–09 (providing family ties departures standards within the Tenth
Circuit).
106
See, e.g., United States v. Sorto, No. CR 07-0158 JB, 2008 WL 4104121, at *1 (D.N.M.
May 5, 2008); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 07-1602 JB, 2008 WL 2371564, at *1
(D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008); United States v. Eriacho, No. CR 06 2168 JB, 2007 WL 6364848, at *1
(D.N.M. Oct. 10, 2007); United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL
1302577, at *1 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007); United States v. Novack, No. 05-10058-01-WEB, 2006
WL 1314295, at *1 (D. Kan. May 11, 2006).
107
Herrera-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 2371564, at *7 (“The requirement that the family
circumstances be extraordinary does not mean that they must be extra-extraordinary; they
must only be outside the ordinary.”); Eriacho, 2007 WL 6364848, at *4 (“The requirement
that family circumstances be extraordinary does not mean that they must be extraextraordinary; they must only be outside the ordinary.”).
108
Sorto, 2008 WL 4104121, at *3 (“‘To warrant departure on this basis, a defendant must
demonstrate that the period of incarceration set by the Guidelines would have an effect on
the family or family members beyond the disruption to family and parental relationships
that would be present in the usual case.’” (quoting United States v. Palma, 376 F. Supp. 2d
1203, 1214 (D.N.M. 2005))); see Hernandez-Castillo, 2007 WL 1302577, at *6 (“The Court
believes that the focus of U.S.S.G. [section] 5H1.6 is on the loss of caretaking and financial
support for the defendant’s family that a defendant’s incarceration would cause.”).
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U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, on the other hand, requires
that the defendant’s care be “irreplaceable” to warrant a family ties
departure.109
While it appears that courts recognize differences in prevailing
departure standards, these inconsistencies remain nonetheless.110
Because district courts have continuously wielded wide discretion in
family ties departures, this area of federal sentencing lacks uniformity
and objective analysis.111
III. ANALYSIS
The vague “extraordinary” departure standard set forth in Koon
sparked confusion among district courts in determining whether a
defendant’s circumstances warranted departure based on the
defendant’s family ties.112 Despite amendments to the now “advisory”
Guidelines, district courts continue to embrace the vague
“extraordinary” standard in Koon when determining whether to depart
on the basis of family ties.113 Although the amended Guidelines section
5H1.6 commentary could inform the problematic Koon standard by
109
Novack, 2006 WL 1314295, at *1 (“A downward departure for extraordinary family
circumstances may be appropriate where the care provided by the defendant is
‘irreplaceable or otherwise extraordinary.’” (quoting United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58,
69 (1st Cir. 2004))). The district court, however, did not expound upon its meaning of
“irreplaceable” in the opinion. Id. at *1–2.
110
See United States v. Hughes, No. 04 445 (CKK), 2006 WL 2092634, at *7 (D.D.C. July 27,
2006) (noting that “it appears that this Circuit has a narrower view of ‘extraordinary’
circumstances that might warrant a family ties and responsibilities downward departure
pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, as compared to the Second Circuit”). The court in
Hughes compared its D.C. Circuit standard, which recognizes that “the imposition of prison
sentences normally disrupts . . . parental relationships” and thus does not warrant
departure, to that of the more lax Second Circuit approach. Id. The court noted that the
Second Circuit allows for departures where the family’s stability depends on the
defendant’s continued presence. Id. at *6.
111
See infra Part III (analyzing the reoccurring issues apparent in family ties departure
determinations).
112
See supra Part II.C.I for a discussion on the differing standards employed by district
courts in determining family ties departures pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in
Koon.
113
Hofer, supra note 93, at 694–95. Hofer notes that one of the biggest challenges to
embracing the advisory role of the Guidelines in federal sentencing is district judges’
reluctance to stray from the Guidelines. Id. at 695. Hofer notes that “[s]ome . . . sentencing
judges continue to describe sentencing in terms nearly indistinguishable from pre-Booker
practice—calculation of the guidelines followed by a search for anything ‘unusual’ or
‘atypical’ about an offense or defendant that might take the case out of the ‘heartland’ and
justify a sentence outside the guidelines range.” Id. at 694–95; see supra note 97 and
accompanying text (providing examples of district courts’ continued reliance on the Koon
standard).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 6

246

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

appropriately focusing on the adverse effects of a sentence on the
defendant’s family members, district courts have been slow to fully
embrace this approach.114
Rather, because district courts focus on whether “extraordinary”
family circumstances are present, they have continued to apply their
own varying standards and thus have failed to adopt a uniform standard
under which to consider these decisions.115 Thus, the same issues
apparent in departure decisions during the Koon era have continued,
despite helpful Guidelines amendments.116 Namely, this inconsistent
and unbridled standard results in unwarranted disparities between
similarly situated defendants in family ties departure decisions.117
Further, under these varying standards district courts have either
completely failed to emphasize the harm families experience upon a
defendant’s incarceration in family ties departures or, in the alternative,
have failed to do so in an objective manner, and thus have allowed
114
See supra note 87 (providing the text of the amended Guidelines section 5H1.6
commentary pursuant to the PROTECT Act). The commentary language addressing
“[d]epartures [b]ased on [l]oss of [c]aretaking or [f]inancial [s]upport” provides a good
starting point for addressing the detrimental effect of incarceration on a defendant’s
innocent dependents and family members. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6
policy statement (2003); see supra Part II.B (discussing the harm caused by incarceration to a
defendant’s family and society in general). However, as the commentary language stands,
courts may utilize these factors if they deem necessary but are not directed to in every case.
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. 3 06 cr 111 (JCH), 2006 WL 2165717, at *1 (D. Conn. July
31, 2006). In Davis, the court noted that “[i]n order to depart [based on family ties], the
court must find the family circumstances to be ‘exceptional’. . . [but] when the defendant
argues for a departure based on ‘loss of caretaking or financial support,’ . . . the court is required
to consider the presence of the [the factors outlined in Guidelines section 5H1.6].” Id.
(emphasis added). While some courts have shifted their focus to the effect of incarceration
on a defendant’s family, others have not. Compare United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No.
CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL 1302577, at *6 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007) (“The Court believes the
focus of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 is on the loss of caretaking and financial support for the
defendant’s family that a defendant’s incarceration would cause.”), and United States v.
Capri, No. 03 CR 300-1, 2005 WL 1916720, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 5, 2005) (“A defendant’s
responsibilities to a child or infirm family member properly may serve as a basis for a
departure under the Guidelines, if the harm to the family member exceeds that which a
normal family member would experience from incarceration of a caregiver . . . .” (emphasis
added)), with United States v. Eriacho, No. CR 06 2168 JB, 2007 WL 6364848, at *4 (D.N.M.
Oct. 10, 2007) (“The requirement that the family circumstances be extraordinary does not
mean that they must be extra-extraordinary; they must only be outside the ordinary.”).
115
See supra Part II.C (discussing the differing family ties departure standards utilized by
district courts).
116
Compare infra Parts III.A.1, B.1 (examining disparities and reliance on genderstereotyping in family ties departure under Koon and the Guidelines), with infra Parts
III.A.2, B.2 (examining disparities and judicial reliance on gender-stereotyping in family
ties departures under the amended Guidelines).
117
See infra Part III.A (discussing continued disparities in family ties departure
jurisprudence).
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unfounded notions of gender bias and stereotyping to influence federal
sentencing.118
To begin, Part III.A.1 of this Note first analyzes unwarranted
disparities in family ties departures that existed under the discretionary
Koon regime.119 Part III.A.2 then examines how courts have failed to
adopt a uniform departure standard and thus have continued to engage
in disparate departure determinations contrary to the goals of sentencing
uniformity.120 Next, Part III.B.1 examines departures determinations
under Koon that properly focused on the detrimental family impact of
incarceration yet provided too much discretion, thus resulting in judicial
reliance on gender stereotypes rather than objective analysis.121 Finally,
Part III.B.2 examines application of family ties departure standards postamendment to show that courts have continued to exercise wide
discretion in this area and thus have failed to engage in meaningful
objective analysis.122
A. Unwarranted Disparities in Family Ties and Responsibilities Departures
for Similarly Situated Defendants Due to the Lack of a Uniform Departure
Standard
Although Guidelines section 5H1.6, which addresses departures
based on family ties and responsibilities, has undergone substantial
amendments pursuant to the PROTECT Act, federal district courts
continue to apply the vague “extraordinary” model explained in Koon
when faced with family ties departures.123 However, federal district
courts have inconsistently interpreted the term “extraordinary” and thus
have developed individualized standards regarding those circumstances
118
See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental effects of a defendant’s incarceration on
his or her family members); see also infra Part III.B (examining district court standards that
fail to objectively focus on the harm to a defendant’s family upon his or her incarceration).
119
See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing disparities in departures between similarly situated
defendants under Koon).
120
See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing disparities in departures between similarly situated
defendants under the amended Guidelines).
121
See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the lack of objective analysis in family ties departures
under Koon).
122
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the lack of objective analysis in family ties departures
under the amended Guidelines).
123
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (providing examples of district courts’
continued reliance on the Koon “extraordinary” standard after amendments to the
Guidelines); see also, e.g., United States v. Williams, Cr. No. 6:07 cr 01207 GRA 1, 2012 WL
4813279, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (“[A] reduction in a defendant's sentence based on
family ties and responsibilities is discouraged, absent a finding that ‘the defendant's family
ties or responsibilities are extraordinary.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429,
434 (4th Cir. 1997))).
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that might warrant a departure based on family ties.124 Naturally,
application of these differing standards has produced unwarranted
disparities in family ties departures among similarly situated
defendants.125 Such disparities stand in direct contrast with Congress’
goal of uniformity in federal sentencing.126 Because the Commission
promulgated the Guidelines in order to address this precise issue,
continued application of these highly discretionary standards will
undermine the purpose of the Guidelines.127
1.

Disparate Family Ties Departure for Similarly Situated Defendant
Under the Koon “Extraordinary” Standard

Because sentencing judges were afforded too much discretion to
depart from the Guidelines under the Koon standard, application of that
standard to family ties departures resulted in the failure of courts to
attain the goals of uniformity.128 Not surprisingly, application of the
124
See supra Part II.C (providing an overview of the differing family ties departure
standards utilized by district courts under Koon and following amendments to the
Guidelines).
125
See infra Part III.A (analyzing the continued disparities in departures between
similarly situated defendants under Guidelines section 5H1.6).
126
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to
be imposed, shall consider . . . the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities . . . .”);
see also supra note 31 (discussing Congress’ goal to achieve uniformity in federal
sentencing).
127
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3 (2012)
(recognizing that Congress sought uniformity in sentencing in promulgating the
Guidelines). Initially, Congress promulgated the SRA in order to create an effective federal
sentencing scheme with uniformity, honesty, and proportionality at its center. Id.; see
Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 57–58 (“The [SRA] . . . [was] [e]nacted in response to
widespread unwarranted sentencing disparity . . . [and was] designed to promote
uniformity by curtailing judicial discretion.”). However, even under the advisory
Guidelines, the Supreme Court recognized the important role the Guidelines played in
reaching Congress’s goal of national uniformity in sentencing. United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 246 (2005). To ensure this goal would be met, the Court required that federal
sentences be “reasonable” and permitted appellate courts to impose a presumption of
reasonableness on sentences within the applicable guideline range. Id. at 260–61; see Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (reiterating this principle).
128
See supra note 31 (providing the purpose of the Guidelines in response to
indeterminate sentencing). In Booker, Justice Stevens argued in a dissenting opinion, joined
by Justices Souter and Scalia (in part), that a federal sentencing regime with too much
discretion would run contrary to Congressional intent. Booker, 543 U.S. at 296 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that a set of advisory Guidelines would allow for too
much discretion in federal sentencing in direct contrast with the sentiments of those
Congressmen involved with the SRA. Id. For example, in discussing sentencing issues
prior to implementation of the Guidelines, one senator remarked that “[t]he present
problem with disparity in sentencing . . . stems precisely from the failure of [f]ederal
judges—individually and collectively—to sentence similarly situated defendants in a
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differing standards for family ties departures that existed among federal
courts under Koon resulted in disparities between court determinations
of “extraordinary” family circumstances warranting departure, even
where the circumstances were similar.129
Given the purpose and goals inherent in the Guidelines, defendants
who face similar family circumstances should experience similar success
or failure when seeking sentencing departures based on family ties.130
However, defendants with similar family circumstances sentenced in
different circuits under the Koon regime faced a contrary reality due to
the application of varying departure standards.131 For example, the
likelihood that a defendant acting as the sole caretaker for elderly
parents would receive a family ties departure would wholly depend on
the standard applied in that jurisdiction.132 If sentenced under the

consistent, reasonable manner.” Id. at 297 (quoting Sen. Laxalt) (citing 130 Cong. Rec. 976
(1984)).
129
But see generally Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22 (arguing that disparities in family
ties departures stem from inconsistent standards of review among the appellate courts as
well as lack of guidance from the Commission). Goldsmith and Porter primarily argue that
the Supreme Court’s decision in Koon set a confusing example for federal appellate courts
when reviewing sentencing decisions so that disparity existed in departure determinations.
Id. at 88–89. To illustrate this contention, Goldsmith and Porter briefly review broad topics
such as “single-parenting,” a “defendant’s responsibilities in [a] two-parent home,” and a
“defendant’s care of [a] spouse, parent, or sibling” in discussing disparities between federal
circuits granting family ties departures since Koon. Id. at 75–78. Goldsmith and Porter
similarly discuss disparities between the federal circuits when granting departures based
on a defendant’s aberrant behavior as more evidence of the Court’s problematic stance in
Koon. Id. at 78–79.
130
See id. at 74–76, 83 (using disparities between family ties departures under Koon to
argue that departure analysis should undergo change in order to reduce sentencing
disparity).
131
See infra notes 132–37 and accompanying text (analyzing disparities in family ties
departures between sentencing decisions arising in the Seventh and Second Circuits).
132
See, e.g., United States v. Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d 218, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that
the defendant moved for family ties departure based on his role as sole caregiver to his
elderly father); United States v. Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d 941, 942–43 (E.D. Wis. 2003)
(noting that the defendant moved for family ties departure based on her role as primary
caretaker to her elderly parents). In Pearson, the defendant resided with her parents,
cooked for them, completed their shopping, drove them to their respective medical
appointments, administered their medication, and managed the household from day to
day. Id. at 943. The defendant’s father was sixty-three years old and suffered from
diabetes and kidney failure, which rendered him “essentially bed-ridden” as he awaited a
kidney transplant. Id. The defendant’s mother was fifty-nine years old and suffered from
diabetes, problems with her kidney, Crohn’s disease, and lymphedema in her leg. Id. The
defendant’s mother also had a history of strokes and required the use of a wheelchair
because of a heal infection caused by diabetes complications. Id. In Robles, the defendant,
much like the defendant in Pearson, undertook significant responsibilities for his ailing
parent, including the completion of his father’s cooking, cleaning, and shopping. Robles,
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Eastern District of Wisconsin’s broad “unnecessary hardship” standard,
the defendant would likely prevail due to the jurisdiction’s more holistic
approach to family ties departures. 133 However, the defendant’s motion
would likely fail if presented to a judge applying the Southern District of
New York’s narrow “uniquely dependent” departure standard.134 Under
the “unnecessary hardship” standard the court would look to all
circumstances surrounding the claim in order to gauge whether or not
departure was warranted. 135 However, under the “uniquely dependent”
standard, the defendant would face a higher threshold in moving for
departure based on the same family circumstances, thus making success
more difficult. 136 This kind of unwarranted disparity between similarly
331 F. Supp. 2d at 220. The defendant’s father had undergone two open-heart surgeries,
wore a pacemaker, and also suffered from seizures. Id.
133
See Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 943, 946 (granting the defendant’s motion for family ties
departures under its “unnecessary hardship” standard); see also supra note 83 (providing
the departure standard utilized in Pearson). In applying its “unnecessary hardship”
standard, the court looked to the specific circumstances of the defendant’s family situation.
Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 943. The court also considered sentencing factors such as “the
need for just punishment, protection of the public, deterrence, and rehabilitation of the
defendant.” Id.; see supra note 93 (providing the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)).
134
See Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (denying the defendant’s motion for departure based
on family ties under its “uniquely dependent” standard); see also supra note 79 (providing
the departure standard in Robles). In explaining its family ties departure standard, the
court explained that hardship to the defendant’s family was not sufficient. Robles, 331 F.
Supp. 2d at 221.
135
See, e.g., Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 942–46. In Pearson, one of the defendant’s siblings
lived nearby, another sibling was unable to drive, and the third sibling lived only a few
hours away. Id. at 943. In granting departure, the court reasoned that despite their
proximity, the defendant’s siblings would not be able to take on the defendant’s family
responsibilities given their limited availability to provide care. Id. at 945. The court
recognized that the defendant’s sister could provide in-home care but would not be
available to provide transportation to medical appointments or perform any required
housework. Id. The court further found it impossible for the defendant’s brother to care
for the parents due to the amount of travel required by his full-time job. Id. The court also
struck down the possibility of a private caregiver during the defendant’s incarceration
based on its expense to the public. Id. at 943. After considering all of these circumstances,
the court concluded that the defendant’s family circumstances were unique because she
actively served as the sole family member available to care for her parents. Id. at 943, 946.
Thus, the defendant’s absence upon imprisonment would cause an “unnecessary
hardship” to her family. Id. at 946.
136
See Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (setting forth the “uniquely dependent” standard for
family ties departures). In Robles, the court held that the defendant’s family circumstances
were not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant departure because the mere presence of
other family members stripped the defendant’s caretaking role of its uniqueness. Id. The
court maintained this position despite statements from the defendant’s cousin and brother
confirming the significance of the defendant’s caretaking in his father’s life. Id. at 220–21.
Unlike the court in Pearson, the court did not consider the potential difficulties or
limitations that could affect the ability of the defendant’s family members to provide the
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situated defendants would result under the Koon regime because courts
failed to adopt uniform standards that would place a uniform focus on
certain family circumstances. 137
While unwarranted disparities in family ties departures existed
across the federal circuits under the Koon regime, this problematic trend
prevailed within federal circuits as well. Under this scenario, a
defendant’s success in attaining a family ties departure would wholly
depend on the standard applied by sentencing judges within the same
circuit.138 For example, a defendant’s success in moving for a family ties
departure based on her substantial financial contributions would likely
be inconsistent throughout the Seventh Circuit under Koon.139 If the
defendant faced sentencing under the “atypical” family circumstances
standard, she would be more likely to receive departure due to the

same care in the defendant’s absence. See id. at 221 (“Presumably, Robles’s cousin and the
other members of his family also can assist in making care giving arrangements for
Robles’s father during any period that Robles is incarcerated. While it is not the Court’s
intent to trivialize the logistical and financial effort that may be required in making these
arrangements, such efforts do not provide a basis for a downward departure . . . .”).
137
Compare Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 943, 946 (holding the defendants family
circumstances warranted downward departure under the “unnecessary hardship”
standard), with Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (holding the defendant’s family circumstances
did not warrant downward departure under the “uniquely dependent” standard). But see
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (discussing the enactment of the SRA in
response to disparate sentencing between similarly situated offenders).
138
See infra notes 139–42 and accompanying text (analyzing disparities in family ties
departures between decisions arising within the Seventh Circuit).
139
See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 145 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 1998) (providing that the
defendant moved for family ties departure in the district court based on significant
financial contributions to his family); United States v. Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d 952, 961 (E.D.
Wis. 2006) (providing that the defendant moved for family ties departure based on
significant financial contributions to support his family). In Owens, both the defendant and
his common-law wife worked to support their three small children. Owens, 145 F.3d at 926.
The defendant claimed that his partner would not be able to financially support their
children in his absence and that the family would have to move to public-assisted housing
and receive welfare benefits if forced to rely solely on his wife’s income during his
incarceration. Id. While both the defendant and his common-law wife had received public
assistance six years prior, neither had ever lived in public housing and both were able to
maintain jobs in the years leading up to the defendant’s trial. Id. In support of his motion,
at sentencing the defendant also argued that he visited daily with his brother, who suffered
from Downs Syndrome. Id. Similarly, in Maas, the defendant claimed that his partner
would face serious financial hardship upon his incarceration. Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 961.
While the defendant was married, he argued his wife would not be able to financially
support their two children on her own and as a result the family home would be foreclosed
on. Id. The defendant also argued that no other family members were able to provide
support for his wife and children during his incarceration as his mother struggled to raise
her own children and his wife was estranged from her family. Id.
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latitude afforded the judge under this broad standard.140 However, if the
court sentenced the defendant under a more exacting standard, such as
the standard arising in the Seventh Circuit requiring that the defendant
show great harm would result to her children upon incarceration, she
would be much less likely to receive departure due to the circumscribed
nature of this departure standard.141 Thus, a defendant in this situation
would face unwarranted disparity in her sentencing throughout the
circuit in which she resides, not because her family circumstances
changed, but simply because courts have failed to adopt uniform family
ties departure standards.142
Under the highly discretionary Koon standard, court determinations
created unwarranted disparities between similarly situated defendants
because these courts analyzed cases under their own interpretations of
“extraordinary” family circumstances.143 These problematic results run
Although
directly contrary to the goals of the Guidelines.144
amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6, pursuant to the PROTECT Act,
provided courts with an opportunity to apply a more uniform departure
standard, courts failed to embrace this language and continued to apply

140
See Owens, 145 F.3d at 926, 929 (providing the district judge’s departure determination
and affirming the decision of the lower court on appeal); see also supra note 82 (providing
the departure standard utilized in Owens). In Owens, the court held that the defendant’s
family circumstances warranted departure because the financial harm that the defendant’s
family would suffer upon his incarceration rendered the circumstances “atypical”
compared to other families whose family member faced sentencing under the Guidelines.
Owens, 145 F.3d at 929.
141
See Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 961 (holding the defendant was not entitled to a
downward departure on the basis of extraordinary family circumstances); see also supra
note 82 (providing the departure standard in Maas). In applying this narrow standard the
court in Maas mused that “some degree of financial hardship . . . from the absence of a
parent through incarceration is not in itself sufficient as a basis for departure.” Maas, 444 F.
Supp. 2d at 961 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B)(ii)
(2006)). Here, similar to the defendant’s family in Owens, the defendant’s family risked the
loss of their home and significant financial support upon the defendant’s imprisonment.
Id. In denying departure the court reasoned that the defendant’s family circumstances
were not extraordinary because the defendant’s wife was employed and was still able to
maintain an income during the defendant’s incarceration. Id. But see Owens, 145 F.3d at 926
(providing that the defendant’s common-law wife was employed and maintained steady
employment for the previous six years).
142
Compare Owens, 145 F.3d at 929 (affirming the defendant’s family ties departure under
the district court’s “atypical” family circumstances standard), with Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at
961 (denying the defendant’s family ties departure based on the court’s standard requiring
that the defendant show significant harm to his children).
143
See supra notes 128–42 and accompanying text (examining the disparities in family ties
departures under Koon due to application of differing departure standards).
144
See supra note 31 (discussing the goal of uniformity at the heart of the Guidelines).
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differing standards, thus continuing the trend in unwarranted
disparities.145
2.

Continued Disparities in Family Ties Departures Following
Amendment to Guidelines Section 5H1.6 Pursuant to the PROTECT
Act

Despite the amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6, which
presented federal courts with an opportunity to streamline analysis
under family ties departures, courts continued to rely on the vague
“extraordinary” standard in Koon and thus created the same inconsistent
and disparate issues present in today’s federal sentencing arena.146 Thus,
disparities in family ties departures continue between similarly situated
defendants, contrary to the goals underlying the Guidelines.147

145
See infra Part III.A.2 (examining the continued disparities in family ties departures due
to the lack of a uniform departure standard among courts following amendments to
Guidelines section 5H1.6).
146
See supra note 97 and accompanying text (providing examples of district courts’
continued reliance on the Koon departure standard). Particularly, the application note
concerning loss of essential caretaking or financial support could provide courts with a
single standard that focuses on the detrimental impact of a defendant’s incarceration on
innocent third parties. See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental impact of
incarceration on defendants’ family members); see also note 87 (providing the amendments
to Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act). But see supra note 53 and
accompanying text (providing policy arguments against consideration of family
circumstances in federal sentencing).
147
See supra note 31 (discussing the goal of uniformity at the heart of the Guidelines).
While courts differ in their applications of family ties departures, courts may also consider
these factors in alternatively determining whether or not to grant a variance from the
Guidelines range based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors. See, e.g., United States v.
Justice, No. CR 09-3078 JB, 2012 WL 394455, at *11–12 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2012) (denying the
defendant’s motion for departure based on family ties but granting the defendant’s motion
to vary downward based on § 3553(a) sentencing factors); United States v. Martinez, No.
CR 09-3078 JB, 2011 WL 6828055, at *4 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2011) (“A district court may also
rely on the existence of family ties and responsibilities in varying downward on a
defendant’s sentence.”). However, variances from the Guidelines do not carry the same
presumption of reasonableness that a Guidelines’ sentence, which includes departures,
does on appeal. See United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL
1302577, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007) (“[I]f ‘the district court properly considered the
relevant Guidelines range and sentenced the defendant within that range, the sentence is
presumptively reasonable.’ . . . On the other hand, criminal sentences that vary materially
from the properly calculated guideline sentencing range are not accorded a presumption of
reasonableness.” (quoting United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006))).
Thus, consistent departures based on family ties and responsibilities still play an important
role in ensuring similarly situated defendants receive similar sentences. See United States
v. Sorto, No. CR 07-0158 JB, 2008 WL 4104121, at *2 (D.N.M. May 5, 2008) (“[T]he court
must still carefully consider possible departures under the Guidelines before it can
meaningfully decide a variance request.”).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 6

254

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

Similar to under the Koon regime, defendants with similar family
circumstances sentenced today face inconsistent results due to the
application of varying departure standards.148 As seen under the Koon
era, the likelihood that a defendant would succeed in moving for a
family ties departure based on her substantial financial contributions
wholly depends on the standard applied in that jurisdiction.149 If the
court in that jurisdiction follows the commentary to Guidelines section
5H1.6, focusing on the loss of financial support or essential caretaking, it
is more likely the defendant’s motion will succeed as the court would
carefully consider the nature of the defendant’s family responsibilities.150
However, if the court in that jurisdiction follows a more stringent
departure standard, such as the Second Circuit’s “particularly severe
hardship” standard, the defendant would be much less likely to receive
departure due to the court’s much more narrow application.151 Thus,
148
See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (analyzing disparities in family ties
departures between sentencing decisions arising in the Eleventh and Second Circuits).
149
See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (providing
that the defendant moved for downward departure based on family ties based on the loss
of financial support that incarceration would bring to his partner and her nephew); United
States v. Davis, No. 3 06 cr 111 (JCH), 2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (D. Conn. July 31, 2006)
(providing that the defendant moved for downward departure based on the loss of
financial support incarceration would bring to her husband and children). In Rose, the
defendant was in a committed twenty-year relationship with his girlfriend, helped care for
the girlfriend’s autistic nephew, and provided the family’s primary source of income. Rose,
722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290. In Davis, the defendant provided the primary means of financial
support for her two children and unemployed husband. Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *2.
150
See Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (granting the defendant’s motion for family ties
departure after considering family circumstances under Guidelines section 5H1.6); see also
supra note 87 (providing the text of the amended Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the
PROTECT Act); supra note 103 (providing the court’s section 5H1.6 departure standard). In
granting the defendant’s motion for family ties departure, the court in Rose reasoned that
“[a] guideline sentence would have ‘caused a substantial, direct, and specific loss of
essential caretaking’ to Rose’s family” and therefore, the court granted the defendant a
three-level departure. Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B)(i) (2010)). The court further reasoned that although the
defendant’s long-time girlfriend was able to work she was “in dire need of [the
defendant’s] support,” because she was “suffering without [the defendant] in the home,”
and was “working night shifts, and . . . [was] forced to spend her resources in order to find
care for her nephew.” Id. In Rose, the court carefully considered the nature of defendant’s
family responsibilities to his girlfriend and her nephew. Id. The nephew suffered from
autism and required “24-hour supervision.” Id. Along with his girlfriend, the defendant
had acted as the nephew’s caretaker, as well as the family’s primary source of income. Id.
151
See Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *3 (denying the defendant’s motion for departure
based on family ties under the Second Circuit’s “particularly severe hardship” standard);
see also supra text accompanying note 104 (providing the Second Circuit departure
standard). In considering the defendant’s claim, the court in Davis placed substantial focus
on whether or not other adults could care for a defendant’s dependents upon his or her
incarceration. Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *2. Though the court recognized that the family’s
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this kind of unwarranted disparity between similarly situated
defendants continues post-Koon because courts have failed to seize the
opportunity for a uniform family ties departure standard and instead
foolishly held on to their own.152
Defendants moving for family ties departure based on critical
emotional support provided to a vulnerable child would face similar
unwarranted disparities depending on the sentencing jurisdiction.153
Here, application of the Eighth Circuit’s narrow “irreplaceable”
caretaker standard would likely result in downward departure, whereas
application of the Fourth Circuit’s broad “irreplaceable” standard would
likely produce the opposite result.154 Despite the similarity in family
income would suffer, it reasoned that this was not the “‘type of loss that substantially
exceeds the loss typically suffered by the family of defendants.’” Id. (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6, Application Note 1(R)(ii) (2006)). The court
determined that the defendant’s husband could adequately replace the defendant as the
primary financial supporter by reasoning that the husband was “able to care for their
daughters and is able to work,” and though “unemployed now, he has been employed in
the recent past.” Id. The court rested its conclusion on the mere presumption that the
defendant’s husband could gain employment rather than delving into the husband’s actual
ability to step in and support the family. Id. This kind of consideration is in stark contrast
with the court in Rose, which delved into the actualities of the defendant’s family
responsibilities. Compare Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (“[The defendant’s girlfriend] is
working night shifts, and she is forced to spend her resources . . . because Rose is not
available to help.”), with Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (“[The defendant’s] husband is able
to care for their daughters and is able to work. . . . While unemployed now, he has been
employed in the recent past.”).
152
Compare Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (granting the defendant’s family ties departure
under the standard enumerated in Guidelines section 5H1.6), with Davis, 2006 WL 2165717,
at *1–2 (denying the defendant’s motion for departure based on family ties under the
Second Circuit’s “particularly severe hardship” standard). In amending Guidelines section
5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act, the Commission presented courts with a uniform
standard applicable to family ties departures. See supra note 87 (providing amendments to
Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act).
153
See, e.g., United States v. Williams, Cr. No. 6:07 cr 01207 GRA 1, 2012 WL 4813279, at
*1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (providing that the defendant moved for downward departure
based on family ties in light of his role in the life of his terminally ill daughter); United
States v. Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097–1100 (D. Neb. 2005) (providing that the
defendant moved for downward departure based on family ties in light of the emotional
support he provided for his young daughter suffering from emotional trauma). In
Williams, the defendant claimed he played a vital role in the life of his seven-year-old
daughter who suffered from brain cancer. Williams, 2012 WL 4813279, at *1. In Bailey, the
defendant claimed that his emotional support was critically necessary to his young
daughter who had suffered from emotional trauma. Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1097–1100.
The emotional trauma suffered by the defendant’s daughter stemmed from the sexual
abuse she suffered at the hands of her mother’s boyfriend. Id. at 1097.
154
Compare Williams, 2012 WL 4813279, at *2 (denying the defendant’s motion to depart
based on family ties under the Fourth Circuit’s “irreplaceable” departure standard), with
Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (granting the defendant’s motion to depart based on family
ties under the Eight Circuit’s narrower “irreplaceable” departure standard). See supra note
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circumstances, defendants would experience disparate departures
because application of the Eighth Circuit standard entails a more holistic
focus on the defendant’s role regarding the vulnerable child.155 On the
other hand, application of the Fourth Circuit standard focuses less on the
defendant’s actual family role and thus leads to dissimilar departure
determinations.156 If both jurisdictions were to similarly consider the
effect of incarceration on innocent dependents, these departure
determinations may prove more uniform and cohesive to the
Congressional intent underlying the Guidelines.157
As previously analyzed, some courts have failed to focus on the
impact of a defendant’s incarceration on innocent family members when
applying these differing family ties departure standards.158 While other

99 (providing the Eighth Circuit departure standard utilized in Bailey); supra note 101
(providing the Fourth Circuit departure standard utilized in Williams).
155
See Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99 (considering the defendant’s role in his
daughter’s well-being). In considering the defendant’s motion to depart, the presiding
judge recounted his gut reaction to the motion and then explained how analyzing the
actual facts of the case changed his mind:
Indeed, when I first skimmed the motion to depart under U.S.S.G.
§ 5K2.0 in this case, my reaction was quick and visceral: “Are you
kidding me?” The Assistant Federal Public Defender asked me to
impose a non-prison sentence on Bailey, a fellow who possessed child
pornography, in order to save the defendant’s little girl. No way, I
thought, hell will freeze over before that happens. I next explain how
hell froze over.
Id. at 1091. In determining that departure was warranted the court looked to the effect the
defendant’s incarceration would have on his daughter. Id. at 1198–99. The court reasoned
that the defendant’s daughter suffered from a serious condition where the presence of the
defendant’s emotional support was critical to the child’s recovery and could not be
duplicated. Id. at 1103. The court relied on evidence from a forensic psychologist’s report
indicating that the daughter suffered from symptoms indicating post-traumatic stress
disorder and had continuously expressed trust in her father, the defendant. Id. at 1098–99.
The court also analyzed a variety of possible alternative caregivers in the event that the
defendant was incarcerated but ultimately determined that none were appropriate or as
effective as the defendant. Id. at 1099–1100. For example, the court reasoned that the
defendant’s mother and father were unavailable because of age and health issues. Id.
156
See Williams, 2012 WL 4813279, at *1–2 (demonstrating a lack of consideration by the
court regarding the defendant’s role in his daughter’s life). In denying a family ties
departure, the court in Williams failed to focus on the health consequences faced by the
defendant’s daughter upon his incarceration. Id. Rather, the court simply reasoned that
the defendant’s circumstances were not “extraordinary” in light of the fact that the
defendant had not maintained custody of his daughter in the past. Id. at *2. The court
noted that custody of the defendant’s daughter had moved from her mother to a third
party. Id.
157
See supra note 31 (providing the goals and purposes underlying the SRA and the
Guidelines).
158
See supra notes 128–57 and accompanying text (examining the disparities between
district courts’ approaches to family ties departures).
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courts have been more successful in this regard, these standards provide
sentencing judges with too much discretion and lead to a lack of
objective analysis in family ties departure determinations.159
B. Judicial Reliance on Gender Stereotyping in the Exercise of Discretion to
Depart Based on Family Ties and Responsibilities
The lack of uniformity regarding family ties departures among
federal courts has produced different court interpretations of the term
“extraordinary,” which often leads to unwarranted disparities in
departure determinations.160 One prevalent issue in these differing
standards is that some district courts fail to take into account the
detriment caused to the family following the defendant’s
incarceration.161 However, harm to the family should be at the center of
family ties departure analysis because such consequences can wreak
punishment beyond that typically encompassed by imprisonment.162
Some courts have properly focused on the detrimental impact of a
defendant’s incarceration under the Guidelines in determining whether a
family ties departure is warranted.163 While this trend better addresses
159
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the continuing lack of objective analysis and reliance on
gender stereotyping present in family ties departure determinations).
160
See supra Part III.A (analyzing the continuing problematic disparities in family ties
departures stemming from different district court departure standards).
161
See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he term
‘extraordinary’ . . . retains its literal meaning: the circumstances of the case must simply
place it outside the ordinary.”); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 07-1602 JB, 2008
WL 2371564, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008) (“The requirement that the family circumstances be
extraordinary does not mean that they must be extra-extraordinary; they must only be
outside the ordinary.”); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the harmful effects of
incarceration on inmates’ families).
162
See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary . . . .”); see also Bush, supra note 46, at 195 (discussing the importance
of considering the defendant’s dependents at sentencing in order to affect the purposes of
§ 3553(a)); Ellingstad, supra note 46, at 980–81 (discussing the social costs of incarceration).
The Second Circuit recognized this principle in United States v. Johnson. 964 F.2d 124, 129–
30 (2d Cir. 1992). There the defendant was solely responsible for caring for four children
under the age of six, one of which belonged to her institutionalized daughter. Id. at 126.
The defendant was convicted of stealing money from the government by inflating her
paychecks in her position as a payroll clerk at the Bronx V.A. Hospital. Id. In affirming the
district court’s decision to depart based on family ties, the Second Circuit held that the
departure had properly been based on reducing the substantial harm faced by the
defendant’s children upon her incarceration. Id. at 129–30. But see supra note 53 and
accompanying text (discussing policy arguments against consideration of family
circumstances in federal sentencing).
163
See, e.g., United States v. Sorto, No. CR 07-0158 JB, 2008 WL 4104121, at *3 (D.N.M.
May 5, 2008) (“‘To warrant departure on this basis, a defendant must demonstrate that the
period of incarceration set by the Guidelines would have an effect on the family or family
members beyond the disruption to family and parental relationships that would be present
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the issue of innocent family members in federal sentencing, courts often
fail to consider this impact in a meaningful way. Rather than using
objective factors to measure a defendant’s caretaking abilities or financial
support to his or her family, courts often rely on notions of stereotypical
gender roles when determining whether the defendant’s absence will
This trend appeared under the vague
harm the family.164
“extraordinary” standard in Koon and has continued under subsequent
amendments to the Guidelines.165 Although recent amendments offer an
opportunity for courts to more adequately focus on this important aspect
of family ties departures, courts have not fully or meaningfully
embraced them.166 Thus, the same risk that courts will improperly rely
on gender stereotypes in family ties departures continues at present.167
1.

Judicial Reliance on Gender
“Extraordinary” Standard

Stereotyping

Under

the

Koon

Court determinations of “extraordinary” family circumstances under
the differing departure standards following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Koon often evinced notions of gender stereotyping.168 Courts
often focused on presumptive notions that female defendants act as

in the usual case.’” (quoting United States v. Palma, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1214 (D.N.M.
2005))); United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Family
circumstances are extraordinary when exceptional hardship to a defendant’s family would
result from a sentence within the Guidelines range . . . .”).
164
See infra Part III (analyzing the continuing lack of objective family ties departure
standards and courts’ reliance on gender stereotypes in departure decisions under the
Guidelines).
165
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the continuing lack of objective family ties departure
standards and courts’ reliance on gender stereotypes in departure decisions under the
Guidlines). While the Guidelines section 5H1.6 commentary does not yet include objective
factors to guide a court’s analysis, this standard provides a good starting point for
meaningful family ties departures. See supra note 87 (providing the amendments to
Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act).
166
See supra Part II.C (providing an overview of district court family ties departure
standards under the Guidelines); see also supra note 87 (providing the amendments to
Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act).
167
See infra Part III.B (analyzing the continuing lack of objective analysis in court
determinations of family ties departures under the Guidelines).
168
See King, supra note 11, at 289–300, for a discussion of the presence of gender bias
under the Guidelines, including the deep-rooted societal view of women as caretakers.
Another critic also recognizes the presence of gender stereotypes in sentencing
determinations. Bush, supra note 46, at 196. Bush notes that judges themselves recognize
that they regard maternal caretaking, as opposed to paternal caretaking, more highly in
making sentencing determinations. Id. Bush further notes that “[s]uch special regard for
maternal care may reflect stereotypes more than it does reality” as family members may
equally suffer harm at the loss of paternal care. Id.
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family caretakers, especially in regards to minor dependents.169 Some
courts completely failed to objectively consider defendants’ roles in the
family by regarding single parents as an ordinary family circumstance
given the frequency with which it occurs today.170 However, other
courts focused on the effects of a single mother’s incarceration on minor
dependents to find that mere status as a single mother is sufficiently
“extraordinary” to warrant departure, despite a lack of objective inquiry
aimed at gauging the reality of the defendant as caretaker.171 This lack of
objective inquiry indicates that sentencing judges rely on their own
assumptions concerning gender roles in the family.172 However, if courts
are to meaningfully engage in family ties departures that truly address
harm to the family they must objectively analyze the defendant’s actual
role within the family unit.173
Indeed, family ties departures based on the defendant’s status as a
single mother have been granted even in spite of policies against
decreased sentencing in such circumstances.174 To illustrate, consider a

169
See generally Farrell, supra note 11 (discussing the influence of cultural assumptions
pertaining to gender roles, including the view of women as self-sacrificing caretakers, in
departure decisions based on family ties and responsibilities).
170
See United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[S]ingle mother status is not
an ‘idiosyncratic’ circumstance, distinguishing her case from the ‘mine-run.’” (quoting
United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1992))); United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d
31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today’s society, and
imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the parent from the children.”).
Under this approach, courts completely fail to objectively analyze the realities of the
defendant’s family circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 17 F. App’x 496, 497
(8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant’s status as a single mother of an infant was not
extraordinary enough to remove the case from the “heartland” of the applicable guideline).
171
See, e.g., United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that
the female defendant’s family circumstances were extraordinary where the defendant was
the sole caregiver for her six young children); United States v. Norton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1014,
1017, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that the female defendant’s family circumstances were
extraordinary where the defendant was the sole caregiver for two young children and also
assisted her nineteen-year-old son with college expenses and health insurance); United
States v. Dyce, 975 F. Supp. 17, 22 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that the female defendant’s family
circumstances were extraordinary where the defendant was the sole caretaker of her three
children). But see Farrell, supra note 11, at 271 (arguing that women defendants are less
likely to receive family ties departures based on their role as a mother because caretaking
duties are culturally regarded as typical female family responsibilities and thus not
“extraordinary”).
172
See Wald, supra note 9, at 138 (recognizing the inclination of sentencing judges to
reinforce gender stereotypes by implicitly regarding women as caretakers over men).
173
See infra Part IV (suggesting amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 that would
provide a uniform departure standard with objective criteria for court application).
174
See supra note 53 (presenting policy arguments against departing on the basis of
family ties). Compare Brand, 907 F.2d at 33 (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in
today’s society . . . .”), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory
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defendant who pled guilty to bank robbery and moved for a family ties
departure based on the fact that she was a single mother to six
children.175 In considering whether to depart, the court struggled with
the seriousness of the defendant’s crime balanced against the need for
general and specific deterrence, the improper implications of departing
from the applicable sentence merely on the basis of motherhood, as well
as the defendant’s lack of concern for her dependents’ well-being until
faced with sentencing.176 Even against these policy considerations, the
court incorrectly granted departure based on the hopes that the
defendant could care for her children and remain together as a “family
unit.”177 Successful departure in the face of these conflicting policies
indicates that the sentencing judge based the decision on the mere idea
of the defendant as a natural caregiver, despite finding that the
defendant actually failed to act in the best interests of her children.178
The court’s failure to objectively measure the defendant’s caretaking role
indicates that departure was based on a gender stereotype rather than on
meaningful analysis.179

cmt. 1.4(b) (2012) (“[T]he Commission believes that despite the courts’ legal freedom to
depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often.”).
175
White, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 292–93. The defendant and her female cousin acted as
lookouts while sitting in a car outside of the bank where the violent robbery occurred. Id.
at 290. The defendant was the biological mother of five children and also retained custody
of her younger sister. Id. at 293.
176
Id. at 296. The court recognized that it had “to be concerned that a downward
departure would send the wrong message that a defendant can commit a crime as serious
as bank robbery and yet be permitted to hide behind her children.” Id. The court went on
to recognize the impropriety of overlooking serious criminal conduct of single parents,
especially “when those parents apparently do not become concerned with the well-being of
their children until they are facing imprisonment.” Id. The court found that the defendant
and her cousin were not concerned with their children’s well-being when engaging in the
violent robbery, especially given the presence of the defendant’s infant cousin in the car
during the robbery. Id.
177
Id. at 296–97; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (providing policy arguments
against consideration of family circumstances in federal sentencing).
178
White, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 296. In granting the departure, the court significantly
reduced the defendant’s sentence from a range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months to a
range of twenty-four to thirty months. Id. at 290, 297.
179
See id. at 295–96 (determining departure without the use of objective factors). In
determining whether to depart, the court failed to look at objective information that would
aid in analyzing the defendant’s role as caretaker. Id. at 295–96. But see United States v.
Crawford, No. 07-CR-73, 2007 WL 2436764, at *7–8 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2007) (considering
letters from health care and social service providers as well as a family therapist when
determining whether to depart based on family ties). In White, the court only considered
the age of the children and the presence of alternative caregivers. White, 301 F. Supp. at
295. Even in considering alternative caregivers, though, the court simply cast away with
one alternative based on its view that it was “unrealistic.” Id.
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Male defendants, on the other hand, are not typically viewed as
fulfilling the same natural caregiving role as female defendants in the
context of family ties departures.180 Rather, male defendants are often
depicted as the breadwinners or primary financial supporters of their
families and as such, must show circumstances above and beyond
significant monetary contribution to receive a reduced sentence based on
family ties.181 By relying on these assumptions, courts failed to engage in
meaningful departure analysis that focused on the resulting harm to the
family from the male defendant’s absence.182 Unfortunately, this unjust
trend has continued over time.183
2.

Continued Judicial Reliance on Gender Stereotyping

Despite amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 that might inform
departure analysis, courts have continued to focus on the ambiguous

180
See United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2002) (reasoning that the male
defendant’s family circumstances would not warrant a departure “even if [the defendant]
could demonstrate that he was the only parent available to meet all of [his son’s] needs.”
(first emphasis added)). Compare United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 194, 199 (3d
Cir. 2002) (holding the female defendant’s extraordinary family circumstances warranted
departure where the defendant resided with and cared for her elderly parents), and United
States v. Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945–46 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (holding the female
defendant’s extraordinary family circumstances warranted departure where the defendant
resided with and cared for her infirm parents), with United States v. Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d
218, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding the male defendant’s family circumstances were not
sufficiently extraordinary to warrant departure where the defendant was responsible for
giving significant care to his elderly father).
181
Compare United States v. Carrasco, 271 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the
male defendant’s family circumstances did not warrant a family ties departure where the
defendant was the primary source of financial support for his disabled wife and three
children), and United States v. Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d 952, 961 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (holding the
male defendant was not entitled to family ties departure where his wife and children
would only suffer economically during his incarceration), with United States v. Savulescu,
No. 95 CR 511-2, 2002 WL 745787, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2002) (holding the male
defendant’s unique family circumstances warranted departure where the defendant solely
provided financial support for his wife and where the defendant’s wife suffered from a
debilitating mental illness), and United States v. Ayala, 75 F. Supp. 2d 126, 138 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (holding the male defendant’s family circumstances warranted departure where the
defendant provided primary financial support for his wife and two children and where the
defendant’s daughter suffered from Downs Syndrome and relied on the defendant for her
unique medical care).
182
See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental and costly effects of a defendant’s
incarceration on his or her family members as well as society in general).
183
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the continuing trend in judicial bias and lack of
objectivity following amendments to the Guidelines); see also Ramirez, supra note 14, at 594
(“If judicial discretion is to be consistent with serving justice in the criminal justice system,
a judge must exercise discretion free from bias.”).
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departure standard set forth in Koon.184 Because the highly discretionary
Koon standard lives on, notions of gender stereotyping continue to make
their way into court decisions regarding family ties departures.185
Similar to the era of family ties departures under Koon, some courts
continue to place too much emphasis on the normalcy of singlemotherhood in family ties departures.186 By only considering the
frequency with which this circumstance occurs, these courts fail to
consider the harmful impact that the single parent’s incarceration may
have on innocent family members.187 Further, while some courts have
properly focused on whether the defendant’s sentence would negatively
impact innocent family members, those courts continue to apply
departure standards without meaningful attention to the defendant’s
actual role in the family.188 Instead, when granting departures based on
family ties, courts often rely on the stereotype that female defendants are
natural caretakers, rather than considering objective factors that might
substantiate that notion.189

184
See supra note 97 (providing examples of district court departure standards that
continue to utilize the “extraordinary” inquiry prevalent in Koon).
185
See supra Part III.B.1 (examining issues with gender stereotyping in the exercise of
judicial discretion to depart based on family ties in the years after Koon).
186
See, e.g., United States v. Hendry, No. 05-40151-01-SAC, 2006 WL 3497772, at *2 (D.
Kan. Dec. 5, 2006) (“Family circumstances are only considered in the most extraordinary
situations. The defendant’s status as a single mother is not such an extraordinary
situation. . . . ‘[It] is, unfortunately, not very uncommon . . . .’” (citations omitted) (quoting
United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 596 (10th Cir. 2006))).
187
See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental and costly effects of a defendant’s
incarceration on his or her family members as well as society in general).
188
See, e.g., United States v. Capri, No. 03 CR 300-1, 2005 WL 1916720, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July
5, 2005) (“A defendant’s responsibilities to a child or an infirm family member properly
may serve as a basis for a departure under the Guidelines, if the harm to the family member
exceeds that which a normal family member would experience from incarceration of a
caregiver, and care from other sources is not reasonable [sic] available to alleviate the
harm.” (emphasis added)).
189
Id. at *6 (granting the female defendant’s departure request without objectively
analyzing her role within the family). In considering whether to grant the defendant’s
motion to depart based on family ties and responsibilities, the court in Capri noted that
“[the defendant] has done a relatively good job caring for her children and managing her
family” and “those who are currently taking care of her children may not be able to do as
good a job as she has done.” Id. (emphasis added). The court came to this determination
without an objective inquiry into the role and responsibility played by the defendant in the
lives of her children. Id. at *5–8; see also United States v. Martinez, No. CR 09-3078, 2011
WL 6828055, at *4–6 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2011) (granting a family ties departure without
objective analysis into the defendant’s role in her family). The court in Martinez
approached the defendant’s motion for a downward departure based on family ties in a
similar fashion. Id. There, without objectively inquiring into the role played by the
defendant regarding her children, the court concluded that “she will be able to take care of
her family members” and that “[Martinez’s] progress in abstaining from
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The trend in granting downward departures for single mothers
continues in spite of policy considerations to the contrary.190 To
illustrate, take for example a defendant who pled guilty to mail fraud
and sought departure based on the fact that she was a single mother of
four children.191 In determining whether to depart, the court struggled
with the propriety of departure in light of the defendant’s lengthy
criminal history, which indicated disregard of her role as a single
mother.192 Despite its trepidation, the court incorrectly granted the
downward departure based on its conclusory finding that the defendant
had “done a relatively good job caring for her children and managing
her family under very difficult circumstances.”193 In doing so, the court
failed to objectively analyze the defendant’s caretaking role and thus
likely based its decision on stereotypical gender assumptions.194
Just as family ties departures continue to evince stereotypical female
gender assumptions, the trend continues for males seeking departure as
well.195 Unlike their supposed “caretaker” female counterparts, courts

methamphetamine use encourages the Court that she will be able to fulfill these duties.”
Id. at *5.
190
See Martinez, 2011 WL 6828055, at *6 (“The Court is very cautious to not
disproportionately sentence men to prison—who also plead that their family needs them—
and then let mothers serve no time in prison. Punishment based solely on the defendant’s
sex or their family role would be unfair and not just.”); see also supra note 53 and
accompanying text (providing policy arguments against considering family circumstances
in federal sentencing).
191
Capri, 2005 WL 1916720, at *1. The mail fraud charge arose from the defendant’s
participation in an elaborate scheme to defraud a life insurance company. Id. The
defendant assisted her co-defendant in securing a loan for $11,750,000 by providing
information she knew or strongly suspected to be fraudulent. Id. The defendant also set
up a sham company to aid in securing the loan with the intent that the company would
receive loan proceeds. Id.
192
Id. at *6 (“[I]t is difficult to avoid the observation that Capri’s repeated decisions to
commit serious crimes that she surely knew could subject her to incarceration are hardly a
testament to good parenting.”) Prior to the mail fraud charge, the defendant pled guilty to
separate felony forgery offenses in both 1994 and 1998. Id. at *3. The defendant further
pled guilty to “corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of the internal
revenue laws” in 1999 after filing nineteen fraudulent tax returns for the year 1992. Id.
Finally, while awaiting sentencing for the mail fraud offense, the defendant was arrested
for a separate fraud charge as well. Id.
193
Id. at *6. The court came to this conclusion despite evidence that the defendant’s
“house was filthy and in extreme disorder, lacked functioning lights, had what appeared to
be several days of discarded food strewn throughout the kitchen, and had dirty clothing
scattered over the floors.” Id. at *4.
194
See id at *5–6 (determining departure was warranted without analyzing objective
factors to justify the decision).
195
See, e.g., United States v. Justice, 2012 WL 394455, at *2, *11–12 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2012)
(denying departure based on family ties where the defendant provided primary financial
support to his wife and young child).
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continue to depict male defendants as breadwinners or the primary
financial supporters of their families who must show circumstances
above and beyond significant monetary contribution to receive a
departure.196 Reliance on stereotypical assumptions, such as females as
“caretakers” and males as “breadwinners,” means that courts continue to
engage in hollow family ties departures without regard to the actual role
of defendants within their families or the harm that incarceration may
cause.197 However, courts can adequately address these harms, through
family ties departures, by objectively analyzing the defendant’s family
situation.198
Up to present, district courts have exercised wide discretion in
developing their own standards for departures based on family ties.199
However, such discretion has created unwarranted disparities in
departure determinations and has permitted judges to freely rely on
their own stereotypical assumptions in making those determinations.200
Considering the issues that have plagued family ties departures since the
days of Koon, this Note proposes a uniform departure standard that
would curb unwarranted sentencing disparity and trigger meaningful
judicial analysis of family circumstances.201
IV. CONTRIBUTION
In addressing the issues inherent in the current standard for family
ties and responsibilities departures, the most efficient way to affect
196
Id. at *11. In Justice, the court mused that “prisons are filled with men who are
fathers. . . . Circumstances that might justify a departure would include a situation where
the young child has serious health problems and requires constant care.” Id. The court also
recognized departure may be warranted for a male defendant where “there was no mother
or other family members present to care for the child, and a lengthier term of incarceration
would result in the father losing custody of the child to the state permanently.” Id.; see
United States v. Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (granting departure
based on family ties where the male defendant helped care for his girlfriend’s nephew and
provided substantial financial support). But see Bush, supra note 46, at 197 (recognizing
that loss of financial support can have a devastating impact on and serious consequences
for the family, especially regarding children).
197
See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental and costly effects of a defendant’s
incarceration on his or her family members as well as society in general).
198
See Bush, supra note 46, at 197 (directing courts to rely on concrete evidence in
assessing the defendant’s family role).
199
See supra Part II.C (discussing the differing district court standards for family ties
departures under Koon and following amendments to the Guidelines).
200
See supra Parts III.A–B (analyzing continuing issues in disparate departures and
judicial reliance on stereotypes without objective inquiry in family ties departures under
Koon and the amended Guidelines).
201
See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 regarding family
ties departures).
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change in court application is by amending the Guidelines. Although
district court judges retain authority to vary from the Guidelines under
the post-Booker advisory regime, the Guidelines still carry weight in
Judges must first calculate the applicable
sentencing analysis.202
Guideline range and then determine whether a departure is warranted
before considering a variance.203 Further, even where courts determine
departure is not warranted, such courts may also consider family
circumstances in alternatively determining whether a variance is
warranted.204 Thus, an amendment to the Guidelines will inform judicial
determinations of departures, as well as variations.
A. Guidelines Amendment
Guidelines section 5H1.6 should first be amended to direct courts to
focus on the impact that a sentence has on the defendant’s family.
Second, the policy statement should be amended to include a nonexhaustive list of objective factors that would aid the court in assessing
the defendant’s actual role in his or her family.
§ 5H1.6 Family Ties and Responsibilities (Policy Statement)
In sentencing a defendant . . . family ties and responsibilities are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be
warranted.
Commentary
Application Note:
1. Circumstances to Consider.—
(A) In General.—In determining whether a departure is warranted
under this policy statement, the court shall consider the
following non-exhaustive list of circumstances:
(i) The seriousness of the offense.
(ii) The involvement in the offense, if any, of members of the
defendant’s family.
(iii) The danger, if any, to members of the defendant’s family as
a result of the offense.
202
Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2007). In Rita, the Court emphasized that
the Guidelines should still carry substantial weight because they reflect data collected over
“tens of thousands of sentences” and thus provide a rough approximation of sentences that
would achieve the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id. at 349–50.
203
See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (providing the “guidelines-first”
approach to sentencing determination adopted after Booker).
204
See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ consideration of family
ties in determining whether to vary from the Guidelines according to the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors).
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(B) Departures Based on Loss of Caretaking or Financial Support.—
A departure under this policy statement shall be based on the loss
of caretaking or financial support of the defendant’s family
requires. iIn addition to the court’s consideration of the nonexhaustive list of circumstances in subdivision (A), departure
requires the presence of the following circumstances:
(i) The defendant’s service of a sentence within the applicable
guideline range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific
loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to
the defendant’s family.
(ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support substantially
exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a
similarly situated defendant. . . .
(iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is one for which
no effective remedial or ameliorative programs reasonably
are available, making the defendant’s caretaking or financial
support irreplaceable to the defendant’s family.
(iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking
or financial support.
(C) Essential Caretaking or Essential Financial Support.—In considering
whether the defendant’s service of a sentence within the applicable
guidelines range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of
essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant’s
family described in subdivision (B)(i), the court should consider the
following non-exhaustive list of factors:
(i) The defendant’s caretaking role in his or her family unit, supported
by evidence from ties in the community as well as experts
specializing in family dynamics.
(ii) The consequences to the defendant’s family resulting from the loss
of the defendant’s income upon incarceration, supported by
evidence of such consequences.
(iii) The age of the defendant’s dependents.
(iv) Whether the defendant’s dependents have special needs or medical
conditions.
(v) The availability of alternative caretakers in the defendant’s family
or community upon the defendant’s incarceration.
(vi) In cases involving minor dependents, whether the defendant’s
incarceration presents the risk of loss of custody.205

205
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contributions of the author. The
text that has not been italicized represents the language as it appears in the original policy
statement and has been maintained to provide context.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/6

Boatman: A Continuing Conundrum: Applying Consistent Gender-Neutral Crite

2013]

A Continuing Conundrum

267

B. Commentary
Guidelines section 5H1.6 should first be amended to mandate that
departure “shall be based on loss of caretaking or financial support of
the defendant’s family” and “requires the presence of the following
circumstances.” By amending the language to mandate loss of essential
caretaking or financial support, the application note will set forth a
uniform standard for district courts determining whether to depart
based on family ties and responsibilities. This standard properly focuses
on the negative impacts of the defendant’s incarceration on innocent
family members, as well as society, and thus will aid courts in alleviating
those harms through family ties departures.206 Mandating this standard
will help ensure that courts no longer apply inconsistent standards
across jurisdictions, resulting in unwarranted departure disparities.207
Because mere application of the “loss of essential caretaking or
financial support” standard would provide sentencing judges with too
much discretion, section 5H1.6 should also be amended to include
objective factors to aid courts in determining whether the defendant’s
incarceration will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss.208 In
applying these objective factors, courts will be better able to assess the
actual roles played by defendants within their respective family units
and thus the impact that incarceration would have on the defendant’s
family.209 In order to assess the defendant’s role as caretaker, the court
should require objective evidence that supports the defendant’s claim.210
The court should also require similar objective evidence to assess the
detrimental impact that would ensue from the loss of the defendant’s
206
See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental and costly effects of a defendant’s
incarceration on his or her family members as well as society in general).
207
See supra Part II.C (explaining the differing family ties departure standards utilized by
courts under Koon and subsequent amendments to the Guidelines); see also supra Part III.A
(analyzing continuing unwarranted disparities in family ties departures resulting from the
application of inconsistent departure standards).
208
See supra Part III.B (analyzing continuing issues in courts’ departure analysis even
where courts considered the effect of incarceration on the defendant’s family).
209
See King, supra note 11, at 302 (“A departure decision should not be made on the basis
of gender but rather on the basis of specific attributes or circumstances of the defendant.”).
210
See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, No. 07-CR-73, 2007 WL 2436764, at *8 (E.D. Wis.
Aug. 22, 2007) (considering objective evidence in assessing the defendant’s role as the
family caretaker). In Crawford, the court considered letters from a community pediatrician,
therapist, as well as an Early Childhood Special Education Teacher. Id. The letters
described the defendant as “the best person to care for her children,” as well as an integral
component in creating a stable, loving environment for her children. Id. One critic
similarly directs courts to rely on concrete evidence to assess the defendant’s parenting
skills. Bush, supra note 46, at 197. Such evidence is important in sentencing because judges
typically are not in a position to evaluate family environments, unlike social workers or
family court judges. Id.
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financial support.211 This would lessen the opportunity for judicial
reliance on stereotypical assumptions of females as “caretakers” and
males as mere “breadwinners.”212 Further, courts should consider the
dependents’ age and special needs, as well as the existence of alternative
caretakers, and the likelihood that parental rights will be terminated, in
order to gauge the gravity of harm caused by incarceration.213 This nonexhaustive list of objective factors will aid judges in focusing more on the
defendant’s actual family situation rather than reverting to their own
unfounded, stereotypical views.
Critics will argue that the proposed amendment will fail to produce
uniformity in family ties departures and will also argue that the
proposed amendment creates poor public policy by creating a sentencing
loophole for offenders merely because they have a family. The proposed
amendment addresses the former argument because application of a
consistent standard, albeit one that includes a list of non-exhaustive
factors, will nonetheless dramatically decrease disparity and better
achieve the goals of sentencing uniformity.214 The proposed amendment
also addresses the latter argument because courts will engage in an
objective analysis and act consistent with public policy by disfavoring
lesser sentences for defendants based on the mere existence of family
members.215 Application of these objective factors will ensure that
departure is granted only where incarceration would surely cause
unwarranted harm. Further, because sentencing judges are required to
balance the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) against departures
under the Guidelines, this provides further assurance that courts will
impose lesser sentences only when warranted.216 In sum, analysis under
the proposed standard will result in more uniform and meaningful
family ties departures.
211
See supra note 47 and accompanying text (recognizing the detrimental effects that loss
of a defendant’s financial support would entail for his or her family).
212
See supra Part III.B (analyzing judicial application of unfounded gender stereotypes in
family ties departures without objective inquiry into the facts of a case).
213
See supra notes 47–49 (discussing how the harm and social cost of incarceration is
influenced by the innocent family member’s age and special needs, the lack of alternative
caretakers other than the state, and the possibility that defendants may lose their parental
rights); see also Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764, at *8 (considering the age and special needs of
the defendant’s children, the availability of alternative caretakers, and the risk that the
defendant would lose her parental rights upon incarceration).
214
See supra note 31 and accompanying text (providing the purpose and goals behind
promulgation of the SRA).
215
See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing policy arguments against
considering the defendant’s family at sentencing).
216
See supra note 93 (providing the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a));
see also supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the amendments to Guidelines
section 1B.1 Application Instructions following Booker).
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V. CONCLUSION
Following the Supreme Court’s departure standard articulated in
Koon, federal courts adopted varied departure standards regarding
family ties and responsibilities. In doing so, courts failed to effectuate
the purposes underlying the Guidelines and effectively combat the
unwarranted harm experienced by a defendant’s family members upon
incarceration. In applying these varying departure standards, courts
created disparities in departures between similarly situated defendants,
contrary to sentencing goals of uniformity. Further, while many
standards ignored the detrimental effects of incarceration on the family,
those that appeared to focus on such harm were applied without
meaningful, objective analysis and allowed for dated stereotypes to
influence departure decisions. While amendments to Guidelines section
5H1.6 presented courts with an opportunity to get it right, history
repeated itself.
In order to solve this continuing conundrum in family ties
departures, section 5H1.6 must undergo further amendment so that it
mandates a uniform and objective departure standard. Under this
standard, Linda Smith, John Doe, and Michelle Johnson would
experience a greater degree of fairness in sentencing under the
In comparing Linda’s and John’s similar family
Guidelines.217
circumstances under the proposed amendment, application of that
standard would produce a uniform result—most likely a successful
departure for both—because the courts would delve into the actual
family circumstances faced by both defendants.218 In comparing John’s
and Michelle’s family situations, application of the proposed standard
would again bring about different results. Here the courts would set
aside any assumptions associating Michelle as a “caretaker” and John as
a mere “breadwinner” and then would objectively analyze the
defendants’ family roles under the proposed factors.219 Thus, John
would likely receive departure although Michelle would not.220
217
See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical based on three defendants’ motions for
departure based on family ties).
218
Based on the simplified hypothetical, both Linda and John play an active role in their
families. They both supply the primary means of financial support while maintaining an
active caretaking role as well. Each defendant also has young children, at least one of
which has special needs. The presence of these factors likely show that the family’s loss
upon the defendant’s incarceration would be substantial. See supra Part II.B (discussing
factors related to family harm caused by incarceration). Thus, upon a showing of factual
evidence, the court would likely depart in both instances.
219
Michelle’s previous success in obtaining a departure indicates the court based its
decision on gender stereotypes. There the court ignored the fact that Michelle’s children
spent most of their time with grandparents and were older in age. In granting departure
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Although Booker ushered in a renewed sense of judicial discretion in
federal sentencing, uniformity remains a vital and important sentencing
goal. Therefore, family ties departures must be applied in a consistent
manner in order to avoid unwarranted disparity. Given the high cost of
incarceration to innocent family members and society in general, the
departure standard should focus on the harmful effects of incarceration
to the family. However, if these goals are to ever be realized, courts
must apply family ties departures in a meaningful and objective way.
The proposed amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 would provide
the means to realize those goals.
Brittany P. Boatman*

the court likely assumed that Michelle played a vital caretaking role in the lives of her
children. See supra Part III.B (analyzing courts’ reliance on the notion of women as natural
caretakers in family ties departures). John’s previous failure likewise indicates that the
court based its decision on the idea of the male “breadwinner” defendant. Under the
assumption, John was not viewed as a caretaker despite evidence to the contrary. Rather,
as a “breadwinner” John was unable to meet the higher departure threshold. See supra Part
III.B (analyzing courts’ reliance on the notion of men as natural “breadwinners,” rather
than caretakers, in family ties departures).
220
Application of the proposed objective factors would show that John plays an active
role in his family, especially to his young children, one of which has special needs, and he
provides key financial support. Michelle, on the other hand, plays less of an active role in
her family that includes two teenage children. Based on these simplified factors, it is likely
that John’s family would suffer greatly upon his absence while Michelle’s family would
likely not. See supra Part II.B (discussing factors related to family harm caused by
incarceration).
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